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To talk about justice, now.  What does one mean, or what does one do, to talk 
about justice, now?  I begin by posing this question because I think the answer, as I 
intend to argue, is that in this current historico-political moment, talking about justice is 
to begin by talking about identity in some way, whether identity serves as the terms of 
debate or the implicit and explicit points of departure.  The theme of this work is the 
question of justice and its relationship to identity politics.  In some form or another, 
contemporary political and cultural theorists now have recognized that identity is 
invariably a political question, and so a discussion of identity politics is normally 
threaded through their work in some fashion.  But they have all encountered the 
problem, in different ways and to different degrees, that identity politics is oftentimes an 
essentializing project, and this essentializing effect has unwanted implications.  Identity 
politics reduces the individual to a particular instance of a de-historicized essence, and 
as such, creates an ethical conundrum that signals the closure of normative ethical 
discourse.  Cultural and political theorists brush up against this theme in a variety of 
ways, becoming mired in discussions about coercion,1 authenticity, or freedom.2  The 
thought that adheres to this theme is that if identity politics is fundamentally an 
essentializing project, then identity politics is (on their terms) a politically flawed project. 
 I do not want to necessarily dispute this theme.  I believe it is a compelling 
critique on many accounts, and I will make clear as I continue that it is a critique that 
current proponents of identity politics must consider.  But, instead of taking identity 
politics in its current form and disparaging its effects, ask instead: in what specific ways 
                                                
1 See Mansbridge 1996. 
2 Appiah, 1994 provides a good overview of the relationship between authenticity, freedom, and collective 
identity, and the role of essentialism in the debates about identity.   
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is identity politics essentializing, and must identity politics be essentializing?  In the 
following chapters, I argue that identity politics has an essentializing effect that is 
undeniable but not inexorable, where this essentializing temptation indeed conjures 
forth an ethical conundrum, and that identity politics can be reconfigured into a politics 
that eschews this paradox by taking its aim to be the negotiation of identity in the face of 
responsibility.  This negotiation represents the recovery of oftentimes marginalized and 
fringe voices and narratives that adhere to individual ethical demands.  A new 
configuration of identity politics can provide new avenues for trying to answer questions 
of justice in a non-hostile, non-essentializing manner, and would represent the 
transformation of identity politics into a fundamentally ethical project.  I write, then, to 
disturb the current discussion of identity politics and attempt to re-orient that discussion 
to understanding two things:  that identity politics was always a fundamentally ethical 
project, and that it can be transformed into a politics that lives up to the ethical 
commitments built into its own theoretical foundations—what I call a politics of 
singularity. 
 To focus on what identity politics looks like in this particular historical moment is 
to allow us to conceive identity politics as an ongoing and transmutative political project.  
It allows us to see that its given form is a product of historical and socio-political 
developments, opening it to genealogical critique.  As a methodological move, it 
prevents us from de-historicizing identity politics, as if its contours have not evolved and 
shifted over time.  However, to focus on its form now also allows us to offer a normative 
theory of identity politics because recognition of its transmutative qualities indicates that 
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its form is malleable, and that its commitments, its assumptions, can all be transformed, 
and that the questions of justice negotiated in its terrain can be of a different kind in the 
future.3   
It is within this crudely delineated dialogue that my project thus also addresses 
this fundamental puzzle that I will call the question of ethics: how can we live ethics in 
identity politics?  The question intimately tethered to this thought is the question of 
responsibility: why be responsible for others?  Various thinkers have signaled that there 
exists a conundrum in the question of ethics, because discriminating ethically requires 
foisting historical constructions upon another, thereby enacting a kind of social and 
ethical violence.  I call this William Connolly's "ethical conundrum."  The question thus 
spurs a further query: can we live ethics in a non-violent mode?  Various figures have 
suggested the answer is "no."  Jacques Derrida, for his part, argues that the question of 
ethics necessarily induces an economy of exchange, and thus must be violent even 
whilst it is necessary to pursue ethics as a political imperative.4  William Connolly 
suggests that ethics must be necessarily violent precisely because our epistemological 
categories, themselves historically constructed/delimited, have an inability to capture the 
living singularity of its subject.5  Again, ethics must be violent.  For Etienne Balibar,6 
                                                
3 Here, I heed Pierre Bourdieu: "For example, historians of art and literature, victims of what I call the 
illusion of the constancy of the nominal, retrospectively transport, in their analyses of cultural productions 
prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, definitions of the writer and the artist which are entirely 
recent historical inventions and which, having become constitutive of our cultural universe, appear to us 
as given."  In an analogous way, my analysis also warns against allowing the way in which identity politics 
has "become constitutive of our cultural universe," to become something understood as given.  
Recognizing the necessity of political identity is not the same as assuming its current configuration is a 
given, historically immutable.  See Bourdieu 1993, 162.  
4 Derrida 1999 
5 Connolly 2002 
6 Balibar 1995; I expand on Balibar's understanding of antagonism later in this text. 
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Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau,7 among others, the question of a violent ethics is 
somewhat unproblematic because ethics' necessarily violent nature simply reflects one 
dimension of political antagonism/agonism—a trait of a healthy democracy.  And then 
there are those writers for which the question of ethics fails even to register when 
discussing identity or community in politics.8  Apparently, we are simply to concede that 
living ethics in a non-violent manner persistently reaches impossibility with each attempt 
to fulfill a normative ethical commitment.9   
These thinkers, on my analysis, have arranged the puzzle improperly.  I argue 
that the question of how we can be ethical itself already betrays the very possibility of 
living ethics as non-violent.  The argumentative aim is twofold:  we are to dislodge the 
question of responsibility from the realm of freedom (of identity), and we are to 
rearticulate it, indeed provoke it, elsewhere—in identity's constitutive formation through 
storytelling as ethical response.  I am not offering a complete rationalization for social 
responsibility and justice, nor will I try to work through responsibility in the terms of 
debate that provoke Connolly's ethical conundrum.  I cut through these issues by 
theoretical displacement—a displacement that will change the context of the questions, 
and their responses, themselves.  Once the question of responsibility and the possibility 
of living ethics non-violently undergo this displacement, we recover an account of 
responsibility in identity politics lying in our inescapable failure of living identity fully and 
with closure.  I show that an account of responsibility is recuperable within identity 
                                                
7 See Laclau and Mouffe 1995 
8 Mansbridge 1996. 
9 Kwame Appiah seeks to solve the problem of ethical violence through judiciously distinguishing between 
morality and ethics in Ethics of Infinity 2008.  I address this separation in the final chapter and offer a 
cross-comparison between my own approach and his efforts. 
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politics once we rearticulate how to live community such that it cultivates the possibility 
of ethical singularity; such a community is lived as multiplicity and becomes the milieu in 
which the notion of responsibility can be articulated as metonymous with the claim of 
identity, and importantly, our responsibility is at once inexhaustible as well as 
constitutive to the formation of identity.  It is in this new stage for identity politics that the 
possibility of living ethics non-violently surfaces, albeit in the very impossibility of ever 
"finishing" living ethics itself.  
Identity politics needs to be critiqued and transformed.  To rework identity politics 
is to rework the terrain upon which questions of justice are adjudicated. A question of 
justice, today, often is a question that, once it emerges, enters the arena of identity 
politics in order to be contested and negotiated.  Whatever the conditions may be which 
allow a question of justice to be queried, it appears that question will likely arrive in the 
scene of identity politics, and that the game of identity politics will intimately shape the 
outcome of the question by setting the terms of its debate.  What is at stake is the 
terrain upon which social transformation can unfold and the viability of ethical discourse 
within this terrain.  A study of identity politics thus becomes a study of praxis, of politics, 
of stories and representation, discipline and normalization.  A new framing of identity 
politics means a shift in how questions are posed, stories are told, and how we each 
come to form an intelligible self from which these questions and stories can be 
articulated. 
The first chapter begins by making a few claims about identity politics—how it 
works, some tensions within it, and the nature of the ethical conundrum that prompts us 
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to rethink how identity politics can be organized and conceptualized.  As a preliminary 
diagnosis that articulates the infrastructure of identity politics, I centralize the question of 
who "we" are and who "they" are as a locus of interest.  Beginning with the second 
chapter, I begin a discussion on the intellectual edifices upon which identity politics sits, 
about how various intellectual traditions have tried to negotiate identity, and how their 
discussions have insinuated themselves into identity politics as assumptions about 
either the Self or how identity politics should unfold.  This discussion serves to provide a 
brief historical narrative explaining how the identity claim, "We are," assumes its current 
form in our "late-modern identity politics."  This narrative does not maintain the pretense 
of a complete story, for it is necessarily idiosyncratic.  I do not seek to fix the emergence 
of late-modern identity politics in a linear reading of history, which is itself a problematic 
political act.  This chapter shows its emergence and relationship to the identity claim 
without compressing together all of the parallel and superimposed genealogical lines 
which leave their trace in this late-modern identity politics. 
In the third chapter, I offer an alternative story to identity's formation in politics 
than the ones informing late-modern identity politics by explicating the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas; the aim is to given an account of subjectivity emerging within an 
ethical modality.  Beginning with the fourth chapter, I articulate a partial theory of subject 
formation centered on scenes of address, storytelling, and responsibility, while indebting 
myself to Emmanuel Levinas, Judith Butler, and Adriana Cavarero for provoking me to 
ask these questions about storytelling and response.  By arguing in this chapter that 
storytelling is a political practice offered as justification for my identity claim, I proceed to 
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illuminate the ethical underpinnings of storytelling and narration while departing from the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas and his apolitical account of responsibility, alterity, and 
freedom.  My hope is that while explicating this theory of subject formation and 
emergence, and jumpstarting from Levinas's concept of the dwelling in the third chapter, 
we can begin to see a picture of subject formation as a creative ethical project that, as 
the fifth chapter will argue, can be installed into a new mode of identity politics—a 
politics of singularity.  These chapters are arranged into a constellation of questions and 
provocations, argued by way of theoretical and literary digression, and it is my hope that 
in the final chapter, these passages will, as Cavarero suggests, reveal their relationship 
to one another in a moment of insightful unity, their meaning erupting in a narrative 
climax.  In the denouement of this climax, I hope the conclusion makes the compelling 
argument that identity politics was always about you, about my responsibility for you, 
"for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all."10  The deepening of responsibility will be 
the key to articulating a fundamentally ethical politics of identity. 
So I move forward with a commitment to affirm identity's pervasive role in our 
current quest to answer questions of justice, and I move forward with a sense of 
appreciative irony in acknowledging that my attempt at reorienting identity politics can 
only occur on the already presupposed terms of the discourse I am attempting to 
transform. "History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake,” mutters Stephen 
Dedalus, that famously uncreative creator.11  Surely we can view our creative limitations 
more optimistically. 
                                                
10 Levinas 1985, 89 
11 Joyce 1990 
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I.  Who Are We, and Who Are They?   
 
- Fascism has many faces, and insisting upon binaries is one. 
Adele Clark, Situational Analysis 
  
Social transformation through feminist activism.  If we understand feminist 
activism in the broadest sense—that is, the pursuit of ending disenfranchisement, 
discrimination and marginalization, or whatever forms these may assume, then feminist 
activism certainly is a good point of departure to see how identity politics sets the terrain 
for negotiating social change and, ultimately, how many attempts at social 
transformation within identity politics encounters a conundrum of ethics. 
I will begin with my own example from the early part of the 2008 fall semester, 
when I proposed to the administration a gender-neutral housing initiative.  This initiative 
sought to create spaces on campus that ignored gender and sexual politics of exclusion 
by breaking down the binaries that informed conventional dormitory arrangements.  In 
short, the initiative sought to establish a housing situation in which students of any 
gender or sexual disposition could room with any person they chose, so long as both 
consented to the arrangement.  This transformation meant that students identifying as 
male and female could room together, and students of transgender identity, queer 
sexualities, or any number of alternative12 ways of sexual embodiment could freely 
                                                
12 I avoid using the term "subaltern" here, in order to heed Spivak: “Many people want to claim 
subalternity. They are the least interesting and the most dangerous. I mean, just by being a discriminated-
against minority on the university campus, they don't need the word ʻsubalternʼ...They should see what 
the mechanics of the discrimination are. They're within the hegemonic discourse wanting a piece of the 
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choose to room with whomever they wished, assisting them in a dormitory arrangement 
that imposed heterosexist or exclusionary norms.  Although this initiative has since built 
considerable momentum, the initial response from the administration is a paradigmatic 
example of the all-permeating influence of identity politics when questions of justice 
emerge. 
After multiple meetings with various directors of housing, academic deans, and 
student leaders, I receive an e-mail from an administrator saying the following:  
As I mentioned to you in our meeting, I spoke w/ the [administrator], [name of 
administrator], and he would like for you to work w/ [name of another 
administrator], Director of LGBTQI, on gathering more information. [The Director 
of LGBTQI] is currently working on some research that is along the lines of what 
you are interested in and will serve as your new point of contact moving forward. 
What I found problematic about this e-mail upon reception, and conceptually intriguing 
afterwards, was that the administration had assumed my proposal de facto fell under 
the penumbra of LGBTQI issues.  Nothing I had put in the proposal suggested that I 
was doing all of this work on behalf of an LGBTQI organization.  I had, in fact, 
emphatically explained that this initiative was in the interest of the entire student body, 
LGBTQI or not.  I had explained that my proposal was not an attempt at wading into 
student interest-group advocacy, but rather a proposal emerging from a diverse student 
body committed to principles of gender and sexual equality – committed to the feminist 
                                                                                                                                                       
pie and not being allowed, so let them speak, use the hegemonic discourse. They should not call 
themselves subaltern” – from Leon de Kock, “Interview With Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation 
Writers Conference in South Africa.” A Review of International English Literature. 23(3) 1992: 29-47.  
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goal of reworking gender/sex relationships.13  Although the proposal, by its sheer 
political scope, encompassed LGBTQI interests, it certainly was not drafted to be 
narrowly concerned as such.   
 My university's response to the proposal betrays a few interesting assumptions.  
The most obvious seems to be that issues concerning gender non-conformity are not 
concerns of the student body as a whole, but of a particular marginalized group, and 
that the burden of working through this question of justice lies on the marginalized 
group.  This is most apparent in the conceptual leap made from "gender-neutral" 
housing to "LGBTQI-friendly" housing.  Of course, the administration may have thought 
that the LGBTQI community simply "got it" when it came to activism concerning sexual 
identity and practice.  However, even if such a justification was offered, there remains 
the assumption, which remains uninterrogated, that the LGBTQI community "gets it."14   
The more pernicious of the presuppositions, however, seems to be that as a 
student advocating for institutional changes, I, individually, am not a sufficient ground on 
which to demand this change.  I must resort to a "new point of contact" through which 
communication can be funneled in the future.  Thus, a particular identity group can 
endorse my proposal.  My initiative will not, or cannot, become a serious item on any 
political agenda until it garners the support of an identity group who will advocate for its 
enactment.  I, myself, can only have my concern voiced when that voice conforms to a 
                                                
13 Here, the concept of feminist politics is not conceived as an identity position, or a particular political 
ideology, but rather as a nodal point for a mode of inquiry that stresses coalitional politics and social 
transformation, in contrast to identity politics' focus on specific group interests that are levered against 
others. 
14 By critiquing the idea of "getting it," I do not deny that living in the margins does not allow one to see 
mechanisms of discrimination and marginalization in places where those in the mainstream do not.  
Rather, I am problematizing the funneling of communication that does not let the mainstream be put into 
question, or see invisible forms of exclusion. 
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collective identity that has been recognized by a body politic to have legitimate claims 
for reformation. The administrator's e-mail implicitly suggested that I am not a legitimate 
political voice until I belong to the LGBTQI voice. 
The pernicious quality of this conceptual move does not solely stem from the 
lumping of the "I" into a "We."  Politics, for both prudential as well as strategic reasons, 
should not be a politics of just the individual alone, and I do not think a politics based on 
the individual versus the community is a productive politics, either.  The perniciousness 
of the administrator's response lies here—in the way it conceives of collectivity: as an 
interest-based politics where the individual's relationship to the community is one of 
antagonism (or the community's relationship to the universal).  This kind of politics 
forecloses my voice from joining politics until I join the antagonistic chorus of a very 
particular type of political collective.  This is the classic reproduction of the problematic 
relationship between the individual and the community that Liberalism attempted to 
resolve.  Political community not need be conceived in this Liberal way, as the 
administrator assumes it should; the concept of community itself need not be so 
univocal. 
 Why this conceptual leap—that a proposal for gender-inclusive housing become 
an LGBTQI proposal?  On the surface, the proposal did not explicitly adhere to any 
political or ideological group, except perhaps broadly to students of politically 
progressive dispositions.  (Although this surface assumption became problematized 
once I discovered that the proposal had wide support from the more socially 
conservative quarters of the campus as well, thus showing that my attempts at 
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maintaining a stable perception of the political beliefs of conservative or progressive 
students failed upon scrutiny.)  This conceptual leap from gender-neutral housing to 
LGBTQI-friendly housing requires as a prerequisite that issues of unconventional 
housing practices be perceived as essentially an issue belonging to the LGBTQI 
identity.  That is, the LGBTQI community is culturally understood to be a unified and 
stable identity group that has the responsibility of adjudicating problems of gender non-
conformity, because such issues constitute part of the essence of what the LGBTQI 
community embodies.  The LGBTQI community "gets it" because of an essential nature 
to their sexual deviancy that gives them natural insight into the concerns of sexual 
deviants.  Thus, the LGBTQI "identity" makes the identity claim for gender-neutral 
housing. 
 This personal example elucidates how I would like to use the term "essentialism," 
which often becomes vacuous, acting more like a swear word then an actual political 
charge in many pop-political discourses.  By essentialism, I mean the notion that 
identities are stable and uncontestable, because they refer to a prior reality preceding 
their social emergence.  These essential identities break from history, if we understand 
history to be a retroactive process of meaning construction and signification.  Their 
essential nature rests on their ability to transcend history and culture.  Thus, the ways 
that these essential identities negotiate problems of difference are also uniform in a 
given space and time.  The result is also a uniform, essential political and social agenda 
for each essential identity.  The issue of gender-neutral housing automatically becomes 
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an LGBTQI issue because solving problems of gender deviance constitutes part of the 
essential LGBTQI political agenda. 
 Essentialism may best be understood as an effect of identity politics, versus 
understanding identity politics to be constructed upon essentialist attitudes.  This causal 
relationship arises from the pathology of difference necessary to establish identity.  
William Connolly describes this pathology thus: 
An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become 
socially recognized.  These differences are essential to its being.  If they did not 
coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity.  
Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies…to 
congeal established identities into fixed forms…[expressing] the true order of 
things… Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into 
otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.15 
In order to establish identity, one pathologizes difference as otherness, and through this 
distancing of difference, a subject attempts to reassure itself of its identity's integrity.  
However, this difference-turned-otherness is often a transformation of difference into 
something "intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, 
dangerous, or anarchical…"16 The idea of otherness as invariably evil, undesirable, or 
abnormal, can take multiple forms that are homologues of one another—Kristeva's 
figure of the abject,17 Solzhenitsyn's menace of the camp18, Joyce's articulation of 
                                                
15 Connolly 2002, 64 
16 Connolly 2002, 65 
17 See Kristeva 1982 
18 See Solzhenitsyn 1998 
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feminine language.19  Always and in each case, difference that matters is difference that 
is evil, oppressive, stupid, dirty, something to be purified, whether through conversion, 
containment, masking, or violent extermination.   
Essentialism is one of the predicates to identity politics.  If difference founds 
identity, then identity founds essentialism by attempting to disguise its own tension-
riddled and fragmented existence.  If someone converts difference into otherness in 
order to secure their own self-certainty, essentialism seems to be the tool in order to 
give the façade of unity and self-certainty that identity requires in order to be politically 
manageable precisely because identity is not stable and unified.  As Connolly writes, 
identity "belongs to difference," and different narratives and histories, all in various 
states of tension with one another, constitute those differences.20 
Essentialism, then, also refers to the violent (whether corporal or symbolic) 
attempt at stabilizing identity and reassuring itself that the original othering of difference 
was justified despite tensions within the boundaries of that identity.  As identity emerges 
in politics, so does an essentialist discourse emerge in order to mask the subsequent 
tensions produced by identity's arrival in the first place.  Such is the irony that 
essentialism, which promulgates the prior reality of essences, is a by-product of the 
multiplicity of irreducibly unique existences preceding and enabling its genesis. 
                                                
19 Joyce 1990, See final chapter, Molly's soliloquy.  There is dispute within the academy of the mood of 
the final chapter; the two mainstream positions suggest that the final chapter is either one of monotonous 
droning or a kind of passionate pain; the stream-of-consciousness is deployed by Joyce specifically to 
prevent an unambiguous engagement with the language.  Regardless of how we choose to interpret the 
mood of the chapter, I can without reservation suggest that this chapter is Joyce's attempt at expressing a 
fundamental feminine mood of ecriture.  Helene Cixous herself, not without controversy, has said that 
Joyce was one of few male authors to explore the possibility of feminine ecriture, and Kristeva herself 
indicates as much in Powers of Horror. 
20 Connolly 2002, xiv 
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 We see instances of essentialism in our politics of identity and difference almost 
everywhere.  The politics of identity negotiation looks like an evolving dialectic, with 
binaries of us/them, man/woman, nationalist/terrorist, and straight/queer, etc. informing 
our discussions on difference.  Within these dialectics of identity, we see an obsession 
with binarism, an internalization of post-Enlightenment sensibilities and a fixation on 
separating good and evil, culture and nature, truth from fiction.  Essentialism and its 
associated binaries adjudicate the norms of gender, of sexuality, of nationalism, and of 
almost major aspect of social life.  The politics behind sexual identification upon birth 
that Fausto-Sterling reveals, for instance, cannot maintain itself without an essentialist 
and dichotomous conception of sex.21  The decision by doctors to "correct" the sex of an 
infant at birth, in order to restore the child to her "true" sex, and the ideologies of sexual 
bodies that drive their decisions, are less objective directives of medical knowledge than 
the reproduction and manifestation of essentialist (and sexist) conceptions of sexual 
bodies.  That there are even politics behind the production of medical knowledge on 
sexuality underscores both the contingency of sexual identities upon social norms as 
well as the deep and persistent presence of dichotomous epistemologies governing the 
sexed/gendered body.   
Essentialism is an indispensable tool to nation building and sovereignty as well.  
The creation of a unified and stable national narrative plays a key part in the 
development of modern states like China, where poor working conditions and low 
wages are justified and normalized by invoking an essentializing narrative about 
                                                
21 Fausto-Sterling, Anne. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York: 
Basic Books, 2000. 
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national "progress," largely defined in macroeconomic terms.22  The historical and 
essentializing narrative of women as domestic child-rearing bodies provides the 
foundation upon which their husbands can leave the home, join the military, fight wars 
or create jobs, and construct a nation whose identity proudly defends its masculine 
emergence—wars, growth in capital, and the defense of the domesticated women and 
children.23  Nations are built on economizing bodies and families, and this economizing 
takes as its jurisprudence the dichotomous conceptions of masculinity and femininity. 
 Essentialism does not strictly function on broad social terms like sexual identity or 
nation building, either; its binaries penetrate into every domain of social existence, 
structuring our bodily habits and customs as well as our relations with one another in the 
home, at school or the workplace, during coffee breaks or in the privacy of bathrooms.  
Essentialist discourses do not constrain themselves to either individuals or broad social 
categories, but provides the terms upon which the two interpolate.   
However, recognizing the sheer overwhelming presence of essentialism does not 
automatically conclude that essentialism cannot be eradicated.  Essentialism relies not 
on universals but binaries, and essential identities remain dehistoricized, averse to 
contextualization and contingency.  Instead of assuming essentialism's inexorability, 
appreciation for essentialism's ubiquity points us towards the necessary persistence of 
identity in social existence despite its contextual contingency.  Essentialisms, and the 
broad binaries upon which they rely, are in and of themselves problematic to the extent 
that they refuse contestation.  In contrast, universals may be a necessary persistence 
                                                
22 Enloe, Cynthia H. 2004, 43-55. 
23 Enloe 2004,148-152 
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for identity formation24, and notions of universality certainly offer resources for 
meaningful social constructions by providing the political and ideological horizons for 
social resistance and organization.25  The new narratives promulgating a universal 
dimension to humanity provides some of the grounds upon which human rights can 
claim to be transcendental rights that cut across space and cultures.  After carefully 
distinguishing between universalism and essentialism, we must let the theme of any 
critique of identity politics be essentialism's persistent presence in politics, and the way 
in which it is deployed as violent monolithic exercises of subjugation, marginalization, 
normalization, or coercion which are fictitiously dehistoricized.  Even so, not all forms of 
coercion, normalization, etc., are incontestably undesirable; they are, simply, rarely 
innocuous and arbitrary, and almost never immutable.  
 Essentialism and identity may not be disappearing from politics anytime soon, 
and they are providing the terms with which we negotiate our questions of justice.  
Which binary emerges as the dominant tool for political negotiation transforms and 
mutates across histories, cultures, and conversations, and although we can 
retrospectively criticize these binaries or essentializing categories, often even 
caricaturizing them and wondering how anyone could sincerely commit to such a false 
dichotomy, we are frequently trapped within our own invisible binaries informing our own 
                                                
24 This argument is made most clearly by Etienne Balibar: "Cultural identity is often described as being 
what expresses the singularity of "groups," peoples or societies, what forbids conflating them in a 
uniformity of thought and practice or purely and simply erasing the "borders" that separate them… But at 
the same time cultural identity poses the question of universality or universalization.  First of all, because 
cultures cannot be thought in their social or anthropological diversity except by comparison with 
universals (whether natural or logical).  Next because this very diversity induces a communication 
"between cultures" or between "bearers" of singular cultures which at least potentially crosses all borders.  
Finally and above all, because the identity of each culture would have to be recognized as containing a 
value that, as such, is universal." From "Culture and Identity (Working Notes)" in The Identity in Question. 
25 See Ernesto Laclau 1995 
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analysis.26  I do not think anyone can claim to always resist and evade the temptation to 
rely on these essentialist discourses, and I certainly cannot claim to do so.  However, 
and as I will elaborate later, recognizing the constant threat of essentialist discourses in 
identity politics and committing oneself to the project of resistance, even while perhaps 
inevitably reinscribing the terms of discourse being subverted, must become an ethical 
imperative.  Even as we move against and within essentialist discourses, and perhaps 
producing new identities that will then violently unite a new group, we must shift the 
terms of debate. 
 So, essentialism is an effect of identity politics that is both ubiquitous as well as a 
source of meaning to the individuals who rely on that essentialism for identity formation.  
However, essentialism's ubiquity also ensures the sustaining of an identity politics that 
prevents the I from having a voice demanding social change, tell a particular story, or 
simply participate in a political agenda, until that I becomes we, where that we is 
produced by first constituting an evil, abnormal, unholy they.  This process is recursive, 
dynamic, and its specificities are historical and contingent.27 
 To return to questions of justice, then, is to return to the scene of identity politics 
upon which essentialist discourses are the major actors.  As identity politics relies upon, 
sustains, and perpetuates essentialist discourses, a question of justice also relies on a 
                                                
26 Admitting that the pressures to submit to binary thinking are powerful does not suggest that we always 
think in a dichotomous fashions all the time, and in the same way each time; thus, the practice of critique 
never ends, because we must always seek to find new ways of relating to binaries in non-essentialist 
ways. 
27 In talking about collective identity, I am thinking of something similar to how Appiah defines it: "…To say 
that collective identities—that is, the collective dimension of our individual identities—are responses to 
something outside ourselves is to say that they are the products of histories…they are social not just 
because they involve others, but because they are constituted in part by socially transmitted conceptions 
of how a person of that identity properly behaves." In Appiah 2007, 21. 
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social scene with a me and a you.  Or, to be more judicious to how identity politics 
actually functions and to foreshadow my own analysis, questions of justice address a 
"they" and a "we."  Who are we, though?  And who are they?  This is less a 
metaphysical question than a political and, as Emmanuel Levinas teaches us later, an 
ethical question. 
 Identities are not crafted in vacuums, and individuals do not have the radical 
freedom that many existentialists and liberal philosophers might lead us to believe.  
Identities are certainly stylized and individuated by the creative energies of the 
individual, but these identities are inaugurated by negotiating norms, available 
possibilities, avenues for subversion, which are themselves made available by culture 
and history.  In short, identities are not created ex nihilo.  How exactly they are created 
will be the subject of my subsequent chapters, but for now, I want to highlight a problem 
in the concepts of "we" and "they." 
The questions of who "we" and "they" are, invariably conjures forth the spectre of 
Connolly's paradox of ethics, a similar paradox that Derrida identifies in Levinas's 
work.28  Connolly describes this paradox as arising because, "without a set of standards 
of identity and responsibility there is no possibility of ethical discrimination, but the 
application of any such set of historical constructions also does violence to those to 
whom it is applied.  Such standards are indispensable constructions rather than either 
disposable fictions or natural kinds…"29 When we speak of a "we" and a "they" in a 
question of justice, we become complicit in a kind of ethical violence because we too 
                                                
28 Derrida, Jacques. "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas." Writing 
and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. New York: University of Chicago P, 1980. 
29 Connolly 2002, 13 
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often rely on an underlying essentialism produced by identity politics.  Or, as Derrida 
suggests, ethical violence becomes inevitable precisely when we speak of others, for 
speaking of them necessarily thematizes them, reducing them to knowledge, and 
consequently to an object for me.  Investigating the same paradox which Connolly 
stumbles upon with his own critique of Levinas, Derrida argues that "the expression 
'infinitely other' or 'absolute other' cannot be stated and thought simultaneously; that the 
'other' cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be the other…"30 
Thus, to even speak of others in an ethical relationship requires reducing others to 
figures in language, a reduction which is an unavoidable violence.  bell hooks articulates 
this paradox poignantly: 
Often this speech about the “Other” annihilates, erases: “No need to hear your 
voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself.  No 
need to hear your voice.  Only tell me about your pain.  I want to know your story.  
And then I will tell it back to you in a new way.  Tell it back to you in such a way 
that it has become mine, my own.  Re-writing you, I write myself anew.  I am still 
the author, authority.  I am still the colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are 
now at the center of my talk. (emphasis added)31 
Connolly, Derrida, and hooks approach this paradox from different perspectives32, but 
they each inevitably approach and wrestle with this paradox when speaking of the 
                                                
30 Derrida 1980, 126 
31 hooks, bell 1990, 151-152 
32 Important differences to note between the three:  hooks is primarily addressing social pressures that 
tempt us to eroticize and exoticize Otherness for our own identity formation through consumption of the 
Other (see her essay Eating the Other).  hooks  shows how the exaltation of other as other can serve to 
simply reinforce the egoism of the Self; the other is not to be appreciated as other, but as other who 
serves my interest.  Derrida, here, is specifically referring to a formal constraint of language when 
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relationship between self and other—which, as a social relationship, will be situated 
within politics.  In identity politics, to speak of identity, to deploy identity in politics, is to 
commit ethical violence because the ethical relationship always collapses back to me.  
For Levinas, this betrays the infinity of the Other.  In politics, this suggests that identity 
politics cannot accommodate a radical ethics always oriented towards others, which 
appreciates them as singularly Other instead of being a blip in a larger identity category.  
Rather, identity politics rests on the paradox that without historical constructions upon 
which to conceptualize others, we cannot craft strategies for relating to them, and yet at 
this very moment, we foist upon them these very historical constructions.          
This ethical conundrum provokes a question:  is ethics necessarily violent?  
Violence here is construed broadly to include physical violence or symbolic violence (as 
Pierre Bourdieu might ask us to understand it)33; when we ask if ethics is necessarily 
violent, what we are asking is if ethics necessarily demands that we impose or intrude in 
upon the Other in a way that reduces them to my terms of discourse, or my particular 
epistemology, or my conception of the good.  This intrusion may be an intrusion of 
bodily integrity or a transgression of political and economic rights, or an assumption of 
identity that the Other never agreed to uphold.  Must ethics be this way?  Although 
some political theorists and philosophers have suggested that this is so34, we might ask 
ourselves: what is the status of this "must"?  As I will argue later, the status of this 
"must" arises because too many people assume that identity politics "must" take the 
                                                                                                                                                       
speaking to the Other, and less about social forces.  However, I think underneath Connolly, hooks, and 
Derrida's work lays the belief that Levinasian singularity  is near impossible to achieve. 
33 See Bourdieu 1999 
34 In Derrida 1999, he speaks of the impossibility of the "pure gift," arguing that pure altruism, or an act of 
gift giving that does not immediately create an economy of exchange, might be an impossibility, and in an 
analogous sense hints at the inevitable failure of ethics that makes ethical inquiry insistent and necessary. 
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form that it currently assumes.  Too many people assume political community "must" be 
constituted in this contemporary way.  Too many assume "identity" cannot be 
established and deployed in any other way—as violent and reductive claims. 
 To recapitulate, we now have two related stories unfolding as we investigate the 
scene of a "we" and a "they" within identity politics.  The first is that identity politics 
functions off of collective identities, and oftentimes effaces the individual demand in 
favor of a group demand.  These collective identities operate under pressures to 
pathologize others as unholy, primitive, abnormal, etc.  Thus, we have a social scene in 
which agents often take the form of "we" and "they,"35 and the tenor of this encounter is 
aggressive, hostile, and curiously reminiscent of colonialist and imperialist sensibilities; 
we are reminded of Fanon's musing, "It is the wreckage of what surrounds me that 
provides the foundation for my virility."36  This is the scene in which essentialist 
discourses take stage.  The related second story is that, as collective groups work within 
the terms of collective identity, the ethical conundrum is encountered where relating and 
interfacing with a "they" is an encounter that oftentimes asks us to apply broad historical 
constructions—themselves the product of essentialist discourses—that pressure us to 
reduce the Other for me in some way or another.  This notion that the Other is for me, 
and in fact the entirety of the world is for me, can be found in the contemporary dialogue 
between communitarians and liberal political philosophers.37  The liberal assertion that 
                                                
35 Appiah 1994 
36 Frantz Fanon 1994, 211 
37 A good discussion of this can be found in Connolly 2002, 68-75 
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the individual must be ensured basic rights (or capabilities38, or resources39, or dignity) 
assumes that the world exists to be mastered by the individual and for the sake of the 
individual's flourishing.  The communitarian, on the other hand, asserts that people 
should harmonize with their communities and environment in order to achieve a 
teleological conception of the good life, and in this way they still assume that the world 
is either simply out there for us to harmonize with, or contains enough plasticity so that 
such a harmonization is possible.40 
All of these debates are not dialogues operating in political vacuums.  On the 
contrary, these discussions are distinctly political in many ways.  We certainly see these 
dialogues relying on the language of "we" and "they."  We hear, between the lines of all 
these arguments, "We liberals…while those communitarians…" and vice versa.  Does 
this delineation between "we" and "they" not reflect particular political and intellectual 
imperatives?  This modernist notion that the world, and the others who inhabit it, are in 
some way or another for me, is an intellectual habit within our current political milieu 
because our identity politics, now, already treats all of these things as being "for me".  
That is, the form of our identity politics—its social scene with we and they, its 
relationship to, and production of, essentialism—has created a climate in which the 
                                                
38 In Nussbaum 2002, she does differentiate mastery over others in a different sense than Liberals, 
insofar as she wishes to challenge the notion of "mastery" and exploitation of others by establishing her 
"capabilities" as a floor below which no human can fall.  However, her argument that capabilities are 
necessary for a substantive human existence conjures forth the spectre of mastery over non-humans 
(read: animals, although probably not environment).  She does circumvent the mastery that I think more 
conventional liberals and communitarians use, but on my reading she simply relocates mastery 
somewhere (and over something) else—that in the realm of animality.  We have not yet abandoned 
mastery.  Gayatri Spivak offers a similar critique in footnote 14 of Spivak 2005.  
39 Dworkin's equality of resources concept comes to mind here, in Dworkin 1978 and later work. 
40 Michael Sandel in Public Philosophy along with Alasdair MacIntyre and friends often betray this concept 
of harmonization when they, rather explicitly, treat communities are fairly homogenous groups.   
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notion that others somehow, in the end, must be for me informs our most basic 
discussions on identity, rights, legitimacy, autonomy, and responsibility. 
The political and social force behind the concept of freedom and rights makes our 
tendency to reduce others for me explicit.  Thinkers such as Connolly uncover the 
pressure to assume that freedom must be bound with attunement and mastery,41 and 
Costas Douzinas himself argues, "We acquire our identity in an endless struggle for 
recognition, in which rights are bargaining chips in our desire for others (emphasis 
added)."42  Arguments about the productive qualities of acts of coercion, although not 
directly using the language of rights and freedom, still implicitly assume that others are 
for me to the extent that I can, and many times should, coerce them into accepting 
certain norms or values, in order for a democracy to be healthy.43  Despite the diversity 
of language used, this form of identity politics (with all of its instruments such as rights44, 
freedoms, coercion, debate and argumentation) teaches us to form our identities in 
precisely the violent ways articulated earlier—that they are for me, they are a broad and 
stable category, and they are probably not just different, but different-as-other. 
This is what it means to say that identity politics is the scene upon which much of 
our questions of justice, or questions of the good, unfold, and that it sets many of our 
terms of debate.  Here, we can offer a preliminary diagnosis of identity politics, then: 
• Identity politics is a scene upon which many of our contemporary questions of 
justice—and its numerous surrogates and homologues—arise, and the actors 
                                                
41 Connolly 2002, 305 
42 Costas Douzinas 2007, 7 
43 Jane Mansbridge 1996.  See also Chantal Mouffe 1995. 
44 Important to note is that, unless otherwise indicated, the concept of rights I am critiquing is a very 
specific articulation of the rights claim as entitlement.  Rights discourse can, and should, be open to a 
radical reconceptualization as responsibility, I will argue. 
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implicated in these questions take the form of a "we" and "they."  The actors are 
collective identities and political communities, formulated to be homogenous. 
• The seductive quality of identity politics is twofold: that "they" are somehow not 
only different from "us," but mad, sick, primitive, and impure, and that their status 
as other also feeds into pressures that give the appearance that "they" are for us. 
• In order for these collective identities to sustain themselves, essentialist 
discourse are generated that recursively constitute and justify their existences.  
These essentialist discourse are ubiquitous, have considerable social and 
historical meaning to the individuals who rely upon them for identity formation, 
but inevitably lead us to an ethical conundrum where relating to others requires 
that we foist upon them historical constructions.  Hence, even when trying to act 
ethically in identity politics, "they" end up being for us in the final instance. 
I mean for this preliminary diagnosis to set the terrain upon which we can try to think 
through the related questions of how a non-aggressive and non-violent ethics can be 
articulated, and what form identity politics should take in order for its ethical possibilities 
to be liberated.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Politics of Singularity 
 
28 
II.  Claims of Identity, Claims of Love 
 
- The metaphor of "voice" implies a speaker…we are not born with a "self," but 
rather are composed of a welter of partial, sometimes contradictory, or even 
antithetical "selves." A unified identity, if such can ever exist, is a product of will, 
not a common identity or natural birthright… A multiple consciousness is home 
both to the first and second voices, and all the voices in between. 
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism 
 
The curious thing about identity is that we do not know exactly what it is, and this 
ignorance (or ambivalence) is a kind of grey zone on multiple levels.45  What is identity?  
Does it refer to a core and pre-social essence installed in each being?  Is it your race, 
gender, sexuality, political disposition, or academic discipline?  Do political groups 
gathered together for collective bargaining count as a new identity, or are they just a 
collective of individuals doing interest-based liberal politics?  Does group solidarity count 
as an identity?  The term is popular enough that one would think that, as a political 
society, we would have established definitively what identity is.  Of course, some people 
might offer the answer that it's just "who you are."46  Maybe.  But I do not think anyone 
                                                
45 I do not mean to suggest that no one has tried to answer the question.  Rather, I mean to point us 
towards its persistently ambiguous use in identity politics.  For example, the Hispanic "identity" suggests 
that it points towards a group of individuals with a shared language.  However, an increasing number of 
Hispanics do not even speak the language any longer, especially the youngest generations.  In addition, 
the way in which "Hispanic" represents an identity dramatically differs with how the LGBTQI identity is 
configured, since LGBTQI people refer to no language, no particular heritage, but rather to a hugely 
diverse array of social customs, practices, and sexual habits.   
46 While Connolly writes that identity is "what I am," he adds how identity is a "slippery, insecure 
experience, dependent on its ability to define difference…" From Connolly 2002, 64. 
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is quite sure what precisely constitutes an identity, in any concrete and static sense.  
What we do know is what constitutes a claim of identity, at least at the grammatical 
level.  "I am…" An infamous clause with a sneaky intransitive verb that also declares 
"You are…" A two-fold accusation.  
I want to proceed with a tentative thought, a thought that will gain elaboration as 
we move forward:  that in today's identity politics, what identity is becomes established 
by what individuals claim (for) in the name of that identity (and the community 
constituted by the claim).  To put simply, identity is the adhering identity claim itself; the 
claim is a performative utterance.47  "Identity" functions as a floating signifier, with an 
ambiguous and anomalous predicate.48  Its amorphous nature assumes a more formal 
character when tightly tethered to an identity claim—the indicative, active, first person 
statement "We are…" This notion of what constitutes identity is not an ontological fact 
about its nature, immutable and uncontestable.  Rather, I offer a descriptive claim 
arising from parsing the intellectual and political histories supporting and perpetuating 
today's tactics and strategies of identity politics.  By describing this history of identity 
politics, we can more thoroughly describe the identity claim, what it entails, the response 
that it elicits, and the contingency of its form and structure. 
                                                
47 A performative utterance is one in which the vocal invocation of a statement creates and gives rise to 
the very content of the invocation itself.  For example, when someone says "I now pronounce you 
husband and wife," the pronouncement itself is performative in that the actual act of the pronunciation 
also created its content.  Another popular example would be a judge's declaration "You are found to be 
guilty."  Judith Butler treats the performative utterance in detail in her own work, especially in Excitable 
Speech: A Politics of the Performative 1997. 
48 Etienne Balibar, for his part, describes something similar to what I am signaling here: "..Better [still, the 
terms of culture or identity] designate an empty place, vacant for a multiplicity of contents and objects, 
and determined by the intersection of discourses that are in turn structured by the categories we have 
singled out." Identity in Question 176. 
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The two dominant intellectual traditions that undergird identity politics' 
contemporary form, or at least two of the most influential traditions, are the traditions of 
the Foucaultian subject and the Liberal subject, and they culminate in what William 
Connolly and Wendy Brown call "late modernity."49  The ways in which these two 
intellectual traditions wrestled with identity and its formation, and broadly the formation 
of the subject, have left residues in the form of assumptions about what constitutes a 
subject and how politics must approach the question of identity. 
The Foucaultian subject's story begins (arguably) with Nietzsche's argument that 
the Self is inaugurated solely through the internalization of systems of justice, of juridical 
institutions obsessed with punishment, negative rights, and the suppression of freedom 
and power.50  Although this may certainly represent a part of the equation, I want to also 
keep in mind Foucault and Butler's lesson that teaches us that the internalization of 
social norms, public morality, and "regulatory grids of intelligibility,"51 also play a role in 
the formation of identity.  Although I will also argue that their account is incomplete as 
well, it will serve as a good point of departure to understand part of the process by 
which "we" and "they" come to form themselves in their solidarity and distinctiveness. 
In Foucault's account of subject formation, "I" am reflexively produced not by 
internalizing punishment, as Nietzsche argues, but by also internalizing social norms 
and norms of morality.  We are not produced a-historically, as Hobbes might have us 
                                                
49 Connolly first coins the term in Identity|Difference, with Wendy Brown elaborating its contours in States 
of Injury. 
50 A good discussion of this can be found in Judith Butler's Giving an Account of Oneself, 10-22 
51 Judith Butler, in Gender Trouble, coins this term  to encapsulate her own understanding of Foucault's 
regulatory discourses of the body. 
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believe52, but rather we emerge in a particular history and culture, and that this social 
milieu provides the terms upon which we form our subjectivity.  Specifically, the 
available options to us are constrained by regimes of truth, where these regimes of truth 
have historical specificity, represent the political victories of certain individuals reified 
into a sort of objective (or at least neutral) truth,53 and these regimes of truth delimit 
what qualifies as legitimate forms of identity embodiment.  These regimes of truth 
determine what counts as biologically man and woman (apparently, being neither 
seems to be beyond our cultural pale),54 what can count as desirable, tasteful, and 
aesthetically competent,55 who counts as worthy of being protected by law, and who is 
excluded from the juridical order.56  What is at stake in the regimes of truth is everything 
from what shoes I put on in the morning, to whether my body will be made to live, or be 
left to die—that is, whether I lead a liveable life.57 
What "I" am, then, is limited, although not in any concrete sense.  These limits 
are limits in as much as they operate on the level of culture and norms, and the 
instruments of enforcement are marginalization, silencing, coercion, exploitation, and 
                                                
52 As Seyla Benhabib points out, we do not spring out of the ground like full-grown mushrooms, as 
Hobbes argues.  Rather, we are born, and we must mature together, with others, and this is a political 
reality. 
53 See McClure 1990 for an account of religious toleration's politically contestable nature and how it 
became normalized in the modern liberal tradition. 
54 Fausto-Sterling 2000, Sexing the Body.  
55 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production – Bourdieu effectively argues that taste and 
preference are largely determined by one's position in the "literary field," where one's position within the 
field of social existence is decided by regimes of normalcy, success, etc.  Thus, one's taste and 
preferences are contingent upon the prevailing institutions and discourses of truth that declare what is 
valued and what is not valued. 
56 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer – although Agamben does not use the explicit language of regimes of 
truth, we might understand the logic of sovereignty, bare life, and the discourses surrounding who and 
what a camp consists of, as a regime of truth in its own right. 
57 "Liveable life," here is a term consciously borrowed from Judith Butler's canon.  It refers to a life that is 
not always caught in the act of being delimited as a life that falls outside of the boundaries set by 
regulating social discourses.  An example of an unliveable life is that of the transgendered individual, 
whose body lives outside of the social field of what is considered acceptable "deviance." 
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violence.  In Foucault's account, as well as those who build on his work, these limits are 
perpetuated and sustained through regimes of discipline, of biopolitics, of discourses of 
truth and confession.  However, as Foucault's later work emphasizes58, "I" am not 
conceived in any deterministic way, arrested and confined within these discursive 
cages.  Individuals have limited creative capacities in negotiating these norms, and to 
choose whether to accommodate, resist, or transform them.  We have the capacity to 
take these norms as the object of our criticism, and to transform them into avenues of 
resistance, of embodiment, and by these acts inaugurate new possibilities for identity. 
Although Butler's example of drag culture as a project of resistance is certainly a 
compelling example59, instances of productive transformation and resistance to norms is 
a common theme among international and cross-cultural social movements.60 
This possibility of creative self-formation, and the refutation of any theory that 
supports identity's emergence ex nihilo, assumes a variety of forms in diverse 
intellectual circles—the notion of life scripts in Appiah,61 or of the different but 
"authentic" voices of Gilligan,62 or Dasein's being-in-the-world for Heidegger.  Although 
the precise diction varies between these constellations of thinkers, the thought is that "I" 
do not emerge into a limitless horizon, but I am (to briefly appropriate Heidegger's 
language) thrown into the world, and when I arrive, I am thrown into history, culture, 
politics—I am thrown into power, and power can take the form of discourse, knowledge, 
norms, subconscious drives, and politico-juridical systems. The result is that in each 
                                                
58 Foucault 1988, see "Cultivation of the Self." 
59 Judith Butler Gender Trouble, See "From Parody to Politics." 
60 See Enloe. 
61 Appiah 2007 
62 Gilligan 1982 
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individuated "I", there lies a trace of the universal as it establishes and constitutes the 
particular.  That is, there is a trace of the they in each I. 
In the Foucaultian story, an identity in the disciplinary society is the idealization of 
one's own interpretation of subjectivation.  We are subjected to regimes of power and 
morality, but we also have capacities for resisting and subverting our own subjection, 
and in the constant struggle, we produce a constellation of self-inscribed norms and 
beliefs that we understand to be our "identity."  This identity functions both to continue 
disciplining our bodies and identities63 as well as providing the momentary discursive 
grounds in order to contest ways of being and living.   
Foucault and friends offer us one way of construing how subjects are 
individuated in their embodiment, their capacities, and their potentialities.  There is 
another influential intellectual tradition that serves as an edifice of how some people 
today articulate how a subject is formed.  This is the liberalism tradition as it concretely 
assumes the form of law and legal theory—think Locke, Hobbes, and H.L.A. Hart.  
Hobbes casts the individual as a subject springing into the world as fully formed (men), 
as atemporal subjects who just sort of step into existence in rather unremarkable 
ways64.  These subjects are, as I interpret them, animalistic in many ways65, and only 
through the power of contracts—that is, the power of law in its codified form—do 
individuals emerge in any politically intelligible sense.  Thus, "we" here are necessary 
                                                
63 See Foucault's genealogy of confession in The History of Sexuality. 
64 Here, I am thinking of the highly abstract fiction of male heads of family "agreeing" to a social contract 
in an anarchic pre-political past in Hobbes' Leviathan. 
65 They are animalistic in the sense that they continue to reiterate Aristotle's definition of human as a 
"political animal."  Bracketing Aristotle's rather sophisticated understanding of what "political" meant, 
insofar as the liberal subject pre-social contract is not yet in political society, he is construed to be an 
animal or "beast" in the Aristotelian sense. 
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constructs of the state which "we" formed and which recursively legitimates the "we" in 
its final instance.  The law, in some form of temporal paradox, gets to decide in advance 
who gets to be a subject and who lacks the legitimacy to be a subject.  I will not dive into 
the internal difficulties of this doctrine, except to say that its tenants have embedded 
themselves into American constitutional law, where its influences on our ways of 
thinking about individuality are difficult to understate.  Specifically, the language of 
rights, which was borne from liberalism, represents one of the crucial historical 
developments that has allowed identity politics today to rely so heavily on the language 
of rights as aggressive claims, where these rights were historically derived from the 
essential natures of, for the most part, white heterosexual men.66  
H.L.A. Hart, rejecting legal realists such as Justice Cardozo and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, was crucial in forging the doctrine of legal positivism in the mid-20th century.  
Although the rise of Hart's legal positivism coincided with the fading influence of legal 
realism67, a feasible mantra arising from his evolving work could be formulated as such:  
there is no such thing as ambiguous law, only procedural law and substantive law.  
                                                
66 Jennifer Nedelsky thus writes, "There are good reasons to believe that all contemporary systems of 
constitutional rights draw on a powerful legacy of liberal political thought.  What is wrong with this 
individualism is that it fails to account for the ways in which our essential humanity is neither possible nor 
comprehensible without the network of relationships of which it is a part. Most conventional liberal rights 
theories do not make relationship central to their understanding of the human subject… Mediating conflict 
is the focus, not mutual self-creation and sustenance. The selves to be protected by rights are seen as 
essentially separate and not creatures whose interests, needs, and capacities are mutually constitutive. 
Thus, for example, one of the reasons women have always fit so poorly into the framework of liberal 
theory is that it becomes obviously awkward to think of women's relation to their children as essentially 
one of competing interests to be mediated by rights."  Nedelsky, in her own way, embarks to rearticulate 
the language of constitutional rights and thus parallels, in a separate and delimited space, my efforts to 
rearticulate the identity claim.  I read Nedelsky to be supplementing my own efforts to reconstitute the 
relationships founded on rights discourse as non-hostile. From Nedelsky 2008, 149. 
67 Legal realists such as Holmes and Cardozo argued that the law was inherently ambiguous, and that in 
its final instance, law was the law of the sovereign, or the law of the judge, and that this determination 
was almost completely arbitrary. 
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Although Hart did express a particular hierarchy of law68, implicit in his discussion on 
enforcement is that in the final instance, law's applicability does not have to be 
ambiguous.  Perhaps except for a few exceptions like legal theorist Duncan Kennedy,69 
legal positivism construes law to be a set of codes applied in a uniform manner to a 
particular instance, and any difficulties resulting from ambiguity in applying the law is 
simply an incidental, if unfortunate, result.  The individual subject, in the legal positivist 
tradition, is a subject who is equally unproblematic and unambiguous, and collective 
entities, such as corporations, are assumed to have the status of a "person," with no 
internal tensions, difficulties, and competing interests.  The same was true of the family, 
until the United States Supreme Court issued a series of cases dispelling the fiction70.  
Before then, the wife and husband became one single entity under the law, and a new 
subject emerged upon marriage.  That is, a new singular subject, arising from the 
collective of wife and husband.  The consequence is that a collective identity emerges. 
 These two accounts of subject formation, the Foucaultian subjects and Liberal 
subjects, provide the landscape upon which identity politics now sits; at least, they are 
two of the largest contours of that landscape.  From the notion of the Liberal subject, 
those of us immersed in identity politics today assume a certain unity in collective 
identities.  Hobbes's depiction of the Sovereign figure provides a case in point.  When 
citizens in the State of California hosted a special election for Proposition 8, a 
referendum negating an earlier state Supreme Court decision to allow same-sex 
marriages, the media had no problem portraying this issue as an identity politics 
                                                
68 Hart 1997; he distinguishes between substantive and procedural law. 
69 See Duncan Kennedy's  1986 Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology. 
70 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).   
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phenomenon, of gays v. anti-gay advocates.  Or, there was the (slightly) more nuanced 
media outlets, primarily online news communities and blogs, who would refer to the 
struggle as a clash between the younger progressive demographics moving against the 
grain of the more rigid older demographics within the state.  Some even framed the 
issue as a fight between the city of San Francisco and everyone else.  What specific 
language used in the fight differed somewhat between commentators, but the habit of 
classifying Proposition 8 as a battle waged between two, and only two, collective 
groups, was difficult not to notice. 
 The fact that much of the LGBTQI community was inflamed over the leadership 
of the opposition to Proposition 8, because the leaders (mostly from the Human Rights 
Campaign) were upwardly mobile white gay men, went largely unnoticed.  That many 
constituents of the LGBTQI "identity" viewed gay marriage as the obsessed issue of 
privileged white gay men, only broke through the largest media outlets infrequently.  
One only has to go to transgender community groups to find that their primary issue is 
oftentimes the issue of physical safety and not marriage.  In addition, LGBTQI 
organizations who operate on the local level, like the Tennessee Equality Project, 
bemoan the obsession from the leaders of the LGBTQI "identity" with gay marriage, and 
shifting their focus away from discrimination in the workplace, in schools, in employment 
and in healthcare.  The normalization of the concept of the Liberal subject, its 
insinuation into our institutions and social norms, allows many of us to wage identity 
politics without paying attention to these inner tensions that make each collective 
identity so dynamic and so contestable.  
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 The notion of the Foucaultian subject and its effect on identity politics is 
somewhat subtler.  Although the following link is not strictly a direct link between 
Foucault's work and the contemporary form of identity politics, it is an attempt at 
describing the social and intellectual milieu which informs and enables individuals 
engaging in identity politics to use the technologies and apparatuses that they do, and 
the assumptions built into their claims.  Broadly, the story of the Foucaultian subject—
that she is not formed ex nihilo, but rather by internalizing and negotiating regimes of 
truth, of relations of power, of available identities—is a story that also speaks to the 
individuated subject, in her own unique way of stylizing her identity in relation to these 
norms.71  Broadly speaking, the concept of the Foucaultian subject offers a social milieu 
which legitimates the project of demanding recognition for unconventional and 
marginalized ways of living and being, because the struggle for recognition of an 
othered identity has been given political value—that of political resistance.  Again, this is 
less an attempt at crediting Foucault and friends for humanizing the project of resistance 
(of identities) than describing a transformation within how resistance manifested in 
politics.   
Ernesto Laclau's describes this proliferation of recognized identities as a partial 
result of post-structuralist work thus: 
I am a subject precisely because I cannot be an absolute consciousness, 
because something constitutively alien confronts me; and there can be no pure 
object as a result of this opaqueness/alienation which shows the traces of the 
                                                
71 Here, we see a similarity to Butler's account of performative stylization and John Stuart Mill's love of the 
individual and non-conforming life.  There is overlap between the political liberalism tradition and the post-
structuralist tradition, and this is an overlap to be celebrated.   
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subject in the object… the possibility of [a] second death: "the death of the death 
of the subject"; the reemergence of the subject as a result of its own death; the 
proliferation of concrete finititudes whose limitations are the source of their 
strength; the realization that there can be "subjects" because the gap that "the 
Subject" was supposed to bridge is actually unbridgeable… This is not only 
abstract speculation; it is instead an intellectual way open by the very terrain in 
which History has thrown us: the multiplication of new—and not so new—
identities as a result of the collapse of the places from which the universal subject 
spoke—explosion of ethnic and national identities in Eastern Europe…struggles 
of immigrant groups in Western Europe, new forms of multicultural protest and 
self-assertion in the USA…72 
There are academics who tirelessly sling their arrows at post-structuralist attempts at 
undermining and threatening terms of discourse73, arguing that such a deconstructive 
project fails to produce productive and normative theories that bolster our 
understandings of good democracy, activism, etc; I do not claim that this criticism is 
wholly untrue.  However, those who work and use the concepts of Foucaultian subjects 
are frequently attempting to do precisely what Laclau suggests is happening:  give 
humanity (or dignity, or any number of homologues) back to those social practices and 
modes of being that could never make it mainstream otherwise.  It was not the radical 
feminism74 of Catherine MacKinnon, or even the suspiciously essentializing (although 
                                                
72 Laclau 1995, 94 
73 It seems almost silly to footnote this, as creating an exhaustive list of critics would consume voluminous 
space.  However, for a prominent and articulate critique, see Seyla Benhabib 1992. 
74 The term "radical feminism" is MacKinnon's own adopted label, and not of my own descriptive choice. 
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important) psychological theory of Carol Gilligan75, that ended up legitimating the social 
practice of drag.  Rather, the practice of drag became a practice that can be defended in 
identity politics when the practice of drag was given political value as a way of living a 
life, of identity embodiment, as a mode of being; this result is in no small part indebted 
to thinkers such as Butler, Fausto-Sterling76, and Haraway for replacing the totalizing 
ideologies of the Subject with theories of multiplicity and proliferated subjects who 
themselves are fragmented, hybrid, and finite. 
 The Foucaultian account of subject formation emphasizes the immense creativity 
needed to emerge as an intelligible subject, where the limits of the self are inscribed, 
reinscribed, and permutated in relation to the context that conditioned its emergence.  
The self, in this account, is a piece of artwork, where I am meant to labor over its 
development, its stylization and individuation, where my paints and pastels are the 
instruments of culture and history—of power and its institutions and mechanisms.77   
 This account of the Foucaultian subject is not the origin of identity politics' 
presupposition that newly proliferated collective identities can, and should, strive for 
legitimacy, dignity, or humanity, but it certainly reinforces it.  "We have rights, and they 
entitle us to x, y, and z" can, in one sense, be read as "We are an identity, with certain 
                                                
75 Although Carol Gilligan never explicitly endorses any kind of essentialism (indeed, her writing shows 
great ambivalence towards it), her choice of the names "Jake" and "Amy" for her case analysis does not 
even represent an attempt at using pseudonyms devoid of gendered connotations.  For critiques of 
Gilligan's essentialism, see West 1991. 
76 Fausto-Sterling 1993 and 2000 "The Five Sexes Revisited." 
77 See Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault.  Also The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982.  Foucault's hallmark 
argument that power does not only subjugate and suppress, but it produces, is well rehearsed by his 
academic conversation partners like Butler or Fausto-Sterling.  Agamben 1998, however, does attempt to 
refute this claim with his figure of "bare life," who has his bios potentiality stripped.  The nuances of this 
debate are important, but would require an extensive theoretical digression that I cannot afford to offer 
here. 
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ways of living and being, that should be accorded respect and dignity," because each 
identity category should have its own place from which to speak.  This is the 
contemporary celebration of multiplicity coinciding with the discrediting of God and his 
surrogates (Truth for Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, Pure Reason for Hegel).   
 These two stories of subject formation—the legal theorist's story informed by 
liberalism and legal positivism, and the Foucaultian story—dovetail and integrate into 
one another in today's identity politics, which I will call late-modern identity politics.  
Kwame Appiah places the first emergence of this late modern identity politics around 
the 1950s, affirming my observation of its relatively recent emergence: 
The contemporary use of "identity" to refer to such features of people as their 
race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion, or sexuality first achieved prominence 
in the social psychology of the 1950s—particularly in the work of Erik Erikson and 
Alvin Gouldner.  This use of the term reflects the conviction that each person's 
identity—in the older sense of who he or she truly is—is deeply inflected by such 
social features.78 
We have these collective identities that are essentialized monoliths, stable and neat 
categories that have sympathetic claims to dignity, humanity, and legitimacy because of 
their newly recognized potentialities as valued forms of embodiment.  The result is a 
politicization of identity that assumes a few things:  that collective groups can assume a 
singular identity, that this resulting identity is an a priori point of departure to make 
claims on behalf of that identity, and that these identity claims can proliferate because 
we recognize that identities should be diverse and multiple (because of the alleged 
                                                
78 Appiah 2007, 65 
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collapse of our trust in totalizing ideologies like Pure Reason and Truth).  Only in late 
modernity, in our liberal disciplinary societies, can the identity claim so assuredly take 
the form "We are--." 
These assumptions are often contradictory and paradoxical, but people do not 
prevent such tensions from manifesting in our politics.79  LGBTQI activism, for example, 
oftentimes makes claims towards diversity and plurality even whilst seeking comfort in 
the biological explanations of sexual orientation that is itself an a priori point of 
departure for their claims of identity.  The usual LGBTQI claim for having new voices 
heard in the era of contingent multiplicity trusts in the dehistoricized and unproblematic 
discourse of biology that asserts itself as foundational. 
These tensions within identity politics are multiple. Laclau describes one of these 
tensions as the horizon of the universal residing within the domain of the particular, 
where the constantly receding goal of universality provides the space for the particular 
to define itself in terms of this unachievable horizon.80  Appiah describes these tensions 
in identity politics well:  
In our liberal tradition we see recognition largely as a matter of acknowledging 
individuals and what we call their identities… As has often been pointed out, 
however, the way much discussion of recognition proceeds is strangely at odds 
with the individualist thrust of talk of authenticity and identity.  If what matters 
about me is my individual and authentic self, why is so much contemporary talk 
                                                
79 I do not intend to argue that these contradictions and tensions are not productive for an identity's 
emergence or for meaning construction.  I do, however, want to highlight that these tensions lead to a 
fractured understanding of how the Self relates to both its identity, as well as the relationship of that 
(collective) identity to the universal community. 
80 Ernesto Laclau 1995 
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of identity about large categories—gender, ethnicity, nationality, "race," 
sexuality—that seem so far from individual?81 
Wendy Brown more directly links Foucault's disciplinary regimes with Liberalism's 
atomistic politics when she argues that "together, [liberalism and the disciplinary society] 
breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary productions but 
oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive 
formation of universal justice,"82 and in this way echoes Laclau's articulation of the 
identity's unique dependence on particularity and its relationship to the universal.  This 
synergistic marriage in identity politics, between Liberalism's universal individual (and 
universal politics) and the Foucaultian normalized and regularized subject, is what 
allows Connolly to argue that identity is established in relation to a series of differences, 
and powerful pressures operate to shape those differences as other.  The 
transformation of difference into other lets the "We are…" statement be a universalized 
claim to particularity against universality, a universality too often transformed into 
oppressive hegemony.  The "We" gives the claim its particular subject(s), but this 
particular subject is conjoined with "are" (esse, to beessence) which, at both the 
grammatical and political level, gives the "we" its universalized and dehistoricized edge.  
The structure of the claim discourages probing the historical contingency of the "We," at 
whose expense the "We" was constituted and defined, and does not lend itself to the 
opening of dialogue.  Instead, a narcissistic soliloquy ensues. 
                                                
81 Kwame Appiah 1994, 149 
82 Brown 1995, 58 
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 There are good reasons why agents of late-modern identity politics have not 
wished to probe this contingency of the "We" on a frequent basis.  If we are indeed 
produced by our subjectivation through regimes of truth and norms, if the Self is that 
creative product of struggling within and against the regulating and disciplinary 
discourses of its given social milieu, then the Self also has an investment in those very 
norms and truths which coordinated its emergence.  Butler writes, "Thus if I question the 
regime of truth, I question, too, the regime through which my being, and my own 
ontological status, is allocated."83  This aversion to putting oneself into question 
represents one of the pressures that Connolly hints at when he writes that there are 
powerful pressures to induce us to pathologize and make evil difference so that it 
becomes other.  Demonizing the other deflects attention away from questioning the 
contingency of the "We," to question its integrity and solidarity—what thinkers like 
Appiah have described as the result of multiculturalism.84 
 The identity claim, however, is more than just "We are…" because it is also the 
simultaneous declaration "You are…" This second statement built into an identity claim 
cannot be withheld from the utterance and invocation of "We," for to establish and 
delimit a group "we," those exterior to the "we" are automatically posited, and they are 
posited as more than not-we.  They are not us because of differences, and as sexual 
difference theorists, sociologists, and queer theorists have reiterated over and over, 
                                                
83 Judith Butler 2005, 23 
84 Appiah writes: "Indeed, when multiculturalists…say that there are so many 'cultures' in this or that 
country, what drops out of the picture is that every 'culture' represents not only difference but the 
elimination of difference: the group represents a clump of relative homogeneity, and that homogeneity is 
perpetuated and enforced by regulative mechanisms designed to marginalize and silence dissent from its 
basic norms and mores." The Ethics of Identity 152. 
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difference is almost never just difference, but a relation of power that calls difference 
into its very being.85 
 I call "identity" a floating signifier because of this two-fold claim.  We do not 
necessarily know what "identity" is, but we do know that making an identity claim 
constitutes and shields my social integrity by simultaneously invoking difference and 
using that difference to pathologize you as foreigner, as enemy, and as something to be 
conquered for me (even though this would eliminate the very difference that constituted 
my identity in the first place; again, the contradictory marriage between the tradition of 
Liberal subjects and Foucaultian subjects emerges).86  
 Claims of identity conform to the semantic quality of the "I am…" invocation, but 
we must take care to notice the diverse articulations that these claims may take.  "I love 
you," can be a claim of identity insofar as it assumes a unitary "I" with a solidified 
identity, and makes a claim of who "you" are—the "you" that I love.  The recipient of "I 
love you" is re-described in terms of the "I," reduced to something for the I, despite its 
romanticized interpretation.  We only need look at the history of "love" as a historical 
justification for men "protecting" women on their behalf, to place them on the pedestal, 
and realize that all too often that pedestal is the domesticated space of the home or 
                                                
85 This, of course, is one of the hallmarks of Judith Butler's work.  Sexual difference is not an 
unquestionable dimension of human bodily existence, but the product of the heterosexual matrix.  
Heterosexism, in a sense, calls sexual difference into facticity, which is why homosexuality is considered 
so threatening.  It does not simply threaten heterosexuality, but it calls into question the fundamental 
paradigm of sexual difference itself. 
86 Homi Bhabha stumbles upon this antagonism without recognizing it as problematic.  He writes, "These 
contingencies [of late-modern identity politics] often provide the grounds of historical necessity for the 
elaboration of strategies of emancipation, for the staging of other social antagonisms."  This is all said as 
a matter-of-factly, and although I too appreciate a politics that uses antagonism to rupture dominant 
hegemonic ideologies or discourses, I cannot subscribe to such an ambivalence towards our dependency 
on political antagonism, without any appreciation for coalitional politics, cooperation, and political kinship.  
See Bhabha 1995, 47. 
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private sphere, a space of imprisonment.  Too often "I love you" is invoked to justify the 
status quo social arrangement, and too often that status quo arrangement is an 
arrangement of subordination or subjection.87 Claims of love are claims of identity, and 
thus political claims, when they are made operational through regimes of discipline.  
Claims of love not need always have this effect, but to avoid such an effect, we will need 
to rearticulate identity politics so that the word "I" can be used without making an identity 
claim; we need to divorce the "I/We" from its conjunction with grammatical intransitivity. 
 This analysis of the "We are…" clause brings a contention immediately to mind: 
that the identity claims "We are," and its adhering claim "You are," are indeed attempts 
to redescribe the subjects, but sometimes, this redescription is an attempt at cutting 
through distorting nationalisms or fundamentalisms.  You might say that you are a hero, 
but I am trying to redescribe you more accurately as a terrorist or a murderer.  The 
nationalist language deployed in the U.S. invasion of Iraq saw the transformation of Iraqi 
citizens into terrorists, where the local citizens heralded the U.S. soldiers as saviors; the 
perpetual invocation of the "national interest" in public discourse saw the disincarnation 
of this abstract and idealized term from the interests of political elites whose agency 
shaped the contours of this "interest."88 In this context, the identity claim attempts to 
contest the inaccurate depiction of another identity—the description of U.S. soldiers 
from heroes into invaders, from "national interest" into "elite interests."   
To this contention, I am skeptical of whether this project of redescription will 
reveal the "true" character of the previously distorted identity, and what this "true" 
                                                
87 Pearl Cleage's play Flyin' West, in the scene where Minny is beaten by Frank while he relates his love 
for her, provides a visceral literary example of this use of claims of love. 
88 See Faux 2006 for a recent account of the political construction of national interest. 
A Politics of Singularity 
 
46 
character is.  Although defending identity claims as an attempt at describing who you 
are—as a terrorist, for instance—might be a strategy for contesting violent idealizations 
and nationalisms, the logic works in reverse as well.  We might try to redescribe you as 
inhuman, impure, unholy, and thus justify your subordination.  We might try to 
"redescribe" your activism as inauthentic or disingenuous.89 This is identity politics as an 
identity free-for-all, as a politics of authenticity and imposition. Ethics has no role to play 
on this political stage.  There only remains room for the monologue of the "We."   "You" 
are just in the audience, constrained by the violence of our speech as we try to 
redescribe you to reveal your "true" or "authentic" nature.  Your voice was co-opted by 
our identity claim to the extent that we are describing you in describing ourselves.  Your 
speech is colonized in our pursuit of identity politics; you have, in an organizational and 
structural sense, become the subaltern for whom I speak.  Or, in other words, the 
subaltern (you) are a by-product of my very act of making the identity claim "We are."90  
Connolly's ethical conundrum rears its head in late-modern identity politics precisely 
because the identity claim takes this specific articulation.91   
 This defense of identity politics will not do, if only because of its insistence of 
revealing "true" identities.  This is an identity politics that remains too tempted to 
                                                
89 Uma Narayan makes the counter-productive qualities of a strategy of "redescription" clear in the first 
chapter of Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism. 
90 Here, I consciously am thinking alongside Spivak's concerns in her 1998 essay Can the Subaltern 
Speak?  Although I use the term "subaltern" with caution, I think it appropriate here because the claim 
"We are" is the political claim that undermines the agency of the "They" from speaking.  "We are…" is not 
an invitation to dialogue, but the demand for recognition of a monologue. 
91 This politico-grammatical analysis suggests that "We are…" is, functionally, always a reductive identity 
claim.  I contend that this is so in late-modern identity politics.  The semantic implications of "We are" 
depend, of course, on its discursive context.  As an analysis of storytelling shows, "We are…" can have 
an antecedent that is itself contestable, negotiable, and heterogeneous.  However, so long as we remain 
within the rules of late-modern identity politics, the attractiveness of the "We are…" claim is derived from 
its ability to make operational the reductive political grammar I am critiquing. 
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reinscribe and perpetuate dehistoricized universalisms as oppressive essentialisms.  
"Culture" becomes falsely idealized, and political communities risk exaggerated 
homogeneity with fictitiously uncontestable histories accompanied by "authentic" 
traditions.92   
 The Foucaultian subject, disciplined and regularized, seeks to politicize his 
individuation with the Liberal subject's demand for recognition from others through 
claims of identity.  The influence of these two traditions have shaped the claim of 
identity to take its contemporary form by exacerbating the individual's antagonism with 
the universal while provoking the claim through the revealing of the contingency of the 
universal at the same time.  We can be concise in describing this tension: late-modern 
identity politics sees the advent of a subjectivity that brings with it a critique of the very 
subjectivity that was supposed to be inaugurated. "We are a subject (not just an 
instance of Subject) so let us assert our particularity against the universal."  These 
claims reiterate a Sovereign "We" constituted by its protest against an exclusion from 
the universal; the "We" is not understood as relational and responsible, but private and 
autarkic.  This claim becomes intelligible by implicitly exploiting the tension that late-
modern identity politics brings between the inauguration of identity and its simultaneous 
crossing of itself through political critique. 
 It is the claim of identity's two-fold accusation that functions to constitute the 
political community (and thus the identity collective) as the homogenized and univocal 
"We" that is prone to soliloquies and monologues.  Community is not lived as 
                                                
92 Sarah Song's 2005 "Majority Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality," makes clear that these 
"authentic" traditions are frequently select social norms that are simply social norms in a minority culture 
that reinforce and reflect the values of the dominant culture.   
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multiplicity, but lived as a struggle to lay claims of right, claims of love, claims of 
entitlement—and as Wendy Brown make all too clear, claims of injury. So conceived, 
identity's anomalous body remains too easily co-opted by essentialisms, too often 
consolidated against those who are different-as-other, and as my later analysis will 
show, too tempted to be deployed as a strategy of violence that forecloses dialogue.  If 
identity was not deployed as the identity claim, but articulated as responsibility through 
and upon difference for you, then "We" might be consolidated not in opposition to 
"They," but consolidated as community as multiplicity, seriality93, or as affinity94 - as a 
home for the first person voice, the second person voice, as well as those in between.  
"I love you" might take back its place as the ideal ethical gesture, divorced from its 
epistemic violence. 
 This is only a brief intellectual genealogy of the dynamic and sometimes 
contradictory nature of our politics of identity now.  What is clear is that this politics 
partially results from the histories of the Foucaultian subject and the Liberal subject, that 
we have a politics obsessed with identity and rights, and these two ideas intersect to 
form identity politics whose actors define themselves against others, simultaneously 
asserting their particularity while reinscribing claims of universality.  The form of this 
claim, the "We are…" statement (while, importantly, a contingent form) is what tempts 
these claims of identity to transform into essentialist claims.     
Combined with the diagnosis of identity politics articulated in the first chapter, we 
see that identity politics is a complicated terrain.  However, even as this complicated 
                                                
93 Young 1997 
94 Haraway 2003 
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terrain makes it difficult to cleanly work through the ethical conundrum articulated in the 
first chapter, what is at stake is the formation of the subject and its identity, its 
heterogeneity, opacity, and relationality.  Creating and individuating one's identity is 
important for us to be in the world, for us to emerge as subjects, to establish ourselves 
as unique individuals with our own stories and narratives to tell, and with our own 
unique relationships that reflect back to us the meaning of what our stories articulate—in 
a sense, who "We are."    
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III.  Beyond Taking Care of Your(Self) 
 
- Prior to the return to itself proper to consciousness, this hypostasis, when it 
shows itself, does so under the borrowed mask of being.  The event in which this 
unity or uniqueness of the hypostasis is brought out is not the grasping of self in 
consciousness.  It is an assignment to answer without evasions, which assigns 
the self to be a self… It bears its name as a borrowed name, a pseudonym, a 
pro-noun.95 
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being 
 
 Up until now, I have been unearthing the stories of identity formation that inform 
and sustain the mechanisms of ethical violence in late-modern identity politics which 
ensconce Connolly's ethical conundrum as a seemingly permanent fixture on the 
theoretical landscape.  The mainstream stories that inform subject formation, like the 
Foucaultian and Liberalism stories, construct a political space governed by norms and 
mores that, in turn, inform our understandings of identity.  To cut through the 
conundrum, I now suggest that we need an account of responsibility that traces through 
our political narrative of subject formation. 
What of responsibility in identity politics?  At least in the United States, it appears 
the notion that as subjects, we are bound by responsibility for others, that an ethics-of-
the-other is constitutive to politics itself, is a politically inconceivable idea.  This is not to 
say that obligation represents a foreign concept; indeed, if our peculiar obsession with 
                                                
95 Levinas 1998, 106 
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contract law is any indicator, we are more than familiar with the idea of obligation.  Here, 
we will begin with a differentiation between obligation and responsibility, and begin to 
give context for this differentiation by exploring the role of responsibility and ethics in the 
thought of Emmanuel Levinas.  This chapter moves through his work by first giving an 
account of transcendence and situating it as a point of departure for understanding his 
concept of infinity and alterity.  Next, it will move towards his analysis of the face of the 
Other, the role of language and the opening up of speech, and finally explicate his 
account of the "dwelling."  My goal is to construct an interpretation of how the possibility 
of ethics traces through these areas in his work, and how we might draw parallels 
between his account of "dwelling" and our own understanding of identity.   
 I choose to use Levinas as a theoretical springboard because he offers a 
different story about identity formation that will help us negotiate the question of ethics 
and responsibility in late-modern identity politics.  Unlike Connolly whose identity-
formation story is one of pathology and othering, unlike the story of the late-modern 
subject who emerges in a protracted antagonism between the universal and the 
particular, and unlike the Foucaultian story where identity is the constant imbrications of 
disciplinary, confessionary, and biopolitical regimes, Levinas's subject emerges through 
the assignment of responsibility.  By using his thought to jumpstart a new story of 
identity formation, I will then begin to depart from his work by threading an account of 
responsibility into storytelling, and then develop a partial political theory based on 
storytelling as an ethical gesture in the following chapter. 
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By illuminating an ethical dimension in the inauguration of subjectivity, I am 
arguing in these two following chapters that the act of storytelling in the consolidation of 
identity is a fundamentally ethical gesture, and that this ethical dimension of storytelling 
can be a resource for us to rearticulate the identity claim in identity politics.  I 
accomplish this by pushing Levinas's account of the dwelling to reconceptualize political 
community, and then by critiquing the dwelling on feminist grounds.  This critique will 
allow me to articulate a conceptually precise notion of political community that is 
responsive and dynamic, hospitable towards others, and where meaning is derived in 
my being-for-others. 
 Levinas is, by many accounts, an elusive ethicist, if we can call him as such.  His 
work is grounded in the phenomenological tradition, so I think it necessary to 
understand his ethics as grounded in this particular discourse, as opposed to 
conventional moral theory or ethical work.96  One of the key differences between 
Levinas and other intellectuals who "do ethics," can manifestly be understood as the 
difference between responsibility and obligation.  While the latter refers to a duty 
established by consent, whereby the subject has the capacity to accept or refuse such a 
duty, responsibility for Levinas is that which cannot be evaded or denied.  One cannot 
evade the assigning of responsibility, but we can certainly ignore it or fail to live up to it 
(as we do always).  Unlike obligation, responsibility does not operate within the realm of 
a subject's freedom, but precedes and enables that very freedom.  We might articulate 
Levinas's distinction between the two thus:  I have freedom because I am responsible, 
                                                
96 By normative ethical work or moral theory, I am thinking of utilitarian ethicists like Peter Singer, or 
psychologist Carol Gilligan and her "ethics of care."  Nothing prevents Levinas's work from being put into 
dialogue with thinkers such as these, but for now, this is not my direct goal. 
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where that freedom from its first instance is scored through with demands by the Other.  
Importantly, unlike how obligation ceases when its terms have been met, responsibility 
for Levinas never ceases.  Instead, it reiterates itself ad infinitum in each attempt to 
discharge it. 
 We can come to understand this notion of an infinite responsibility by first 
understanding Levinas's position on transcendence.  However, as we move forward, it 
should become clear that Levinas is not trying to necessarily offer normative ethical 
schematics.  Some have described him as advocating for a "normativity without norms," 
or an ethical theory with normative force that is open ended, in contrast to being 
prescriptive.97  He is not interested in "how should we live life?" but in "what makes it 
possible, and what does it mean, to live ethics?"  
 
Transcendence  
 On the first page of Otherwise Than Being, Or Beyond Essence, Levinas makes 
his position on transcendence in comparison to thinkers like Husserl and Heidegger 
clear:  
If transcendence has meaning, it can only signify the fact that the event of being, 
the esse, the essence, passes over to what is other than being… Transcendence 
is passing over to being's other, otherwise than being.  Not to be otherwise, but 
otherwise than being.  And not to not-be; passing over is not here equivalent to 
                                                
97 Perpich 2008, 126 
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dying.  Being and not-being illuminate one another, and unfold a speculative 
dialectic which is a determination of being.98 
Levinas defines the problem of transcendence differently from either Husserl or 
Heidegger.  The problem of transcendence, as is formulated by Husserl and Heidegger, 
is a problem of "knowing."  How does a subject move beyond the immanent subjective 
sphere and "know" real phenomena?  In a sense, how specifically does consciousness 
come to access its object?99  For Levinas, transcendence does not consist in moving 
beyond being to somewhere else.  Unlike Heidegger, who understood transcendence as 
Dasein's already-passing-over to World, our thrownness into World, Levinas maintains 
that the subject transcends him or herself within finitude.  What the subject transcends 
is not into a world of objects, separated from the subject, but rather into immanence.
 We can make this problem clearer by briefly turning towards his work on what we 
might call mere being.  Levinas claims that being is a burden, an inescapable condition 
where we are riveted to being.  Being is, to sum up, hard to do.  We must constantly 
nourish ourselves with food, shield ourselves from danger and maintain our bodies.  
There is a doubling-over in being, for our very capacity for action immediately crosses 
itself because our actions must focus on sustaining the very body needed for that 
action.  Even mere being, then, takes effort.  Drawing from De l'existence á l'existant, 
Bloechl articulates a description of the difficulty and horror of mere being in Levinas: 
                                                
98 Levinas 1998, 3 
99 We need not dwell on how Husserl and Heidegger try to answer these questions; their answers are well 
articulated in their own works as well as the secondary literature.  See Diane Perpich's The Ethics of 
Emmanuel Levinas 23-30.  It will suffice to say that Husserl and Heidegger reached the conclusion that 
the Cartesian habit of rigorously separating subject and object was flawed, because consciousness does 
not preside and lord over transcendental objects, but it remains constantly immersed with its objects, 
together; this is the classic formulation of intentionality: consciousness never is, but rather consciousness-
of-something. 
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According to Levinas, few experiences bring home to us a sense that our very 
being is effort better than insomnia… It would be short-sighted to identify 
insomnia with a mere slackening of attention, a word that still ʻpresupposes the 
freedom of the ego that directs itʼ. Rather, one watches when there is nothing to 
watch or, better, watches without focus or pattern. The insomniac is reduced to 
naked vigilance, to a gaze that is helplessly exposed before a night without stable 
shape or texture. If subjectivity must include freedom and the power to act, then 
strictly speaking this is a vigilance and a gaze without a subject. It is therefore 
also a vigilance and a gaze that does not open out onto objects… In insomnia, 
the effort of being is reduced to helpless protest—for, after all, insomnia is a 
torment.  Levinas writes of 'horror' at a presence without perspective, at the 
positivity of what remains after every negation. 'Horror', then, is his name for an 
affection that signals the approach of anonymous being, of being in general.100 
Insomnia induces us into a kind of paralysis at the sheer fact of being, the 'there-is.'101  
As we lay in bed, with focusing on nothing in particular, we are overcome with a 
horrifying paralysis of the fact that we cannot escape being, that we are riveted in place 
by the sheer facticity of our existence.  In terms of visceral phenomenology, this is one 
of Levinas's most enduring and compelling accounts of how we might understand what 
sheer being might feel.102  We remain trapped within being because even inducing 
death is not an option.  Death, as an event, is not something within a subject's control.  
                                                
100 Bloechl 2005, 80 
101 Levinas terms this fact of 'there-is' as "il y a."  
102 It is important to note that Levinas is not technically offering a description of what sheer being might 
feel like, for access to such a feeling is impossible.  Rather, physical states like fatigue and insomnia 
approach the feeling of sheer being, and points towards the difficulty of being's positivity. 
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The subject can surely arrange to increase the probability of imminent death, but in the 
very moment of death itself, the subject is negated.  There is no agency in suicide.  
Rather, death comes to me in Levinas's account. 
 The difficulty and entrenchment of being, for Levinas, is made perhaps most 
lucidly in his account of the extreme case (or limit case) of the entrenchment of being—
that of torture. Suffering is, for Levinas: 
Suffering is, of course, a datum in consciousness…but in this very "content" it is 
in-spite-of-consciousness, the unassumable. "Unassumability" that does not 
result from excessive intensity of a sensation…but an excess, an unwelcome 
superfluity, that is inscribed in a sensorial content, penetrating, as suffering… It is 
not only the consciousness of rejection or a symptom of rejection, but this 
rejection itself: a backward consciousness, "operating" not as "grasp" but as 
revulsion.103 
Because suffering is unassumed, because it is in-spite-of-consciousness, I do not will it 
away or manage it through some sort of strategic mastery.  Torture, extreme suffering, 
useless suffering, the "ache of pain—woe," reveals to me the structure of passivity that 
characterizes the original pre-transcendent dimension of being.104  It is more than just 
an ordinary passivity, where I actively process stimuli and choose non-action.  This is 
passivity before passivity, an immobilization of being that lies before my very freedom.  
It shows, in a similar manner as insomnia and fatigue, my submission to being, my 
inability to do anything but resign myself to being.  The depth of this resignation, in the 
                                                
103 Levinas 1998b, 91 
104 ibid 92 
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limit case of torture, is described by Levinas with the diction of absorption (of 
consciousness), bordering intoxication.  It is not a performance or an act of 
consciousness, but the originary limit or threshold of being.  Torture and suffering 
induce psychological states of anxiety.105 
 Enchained by the fact of our being, and without recourse to death106, the problem 
of transcendence for Levinas can then be formulated as the question, "how do I escape, 
or transcend, the sheer horror and burden of mere being?"  Robert Bernasconi puts it 
this way: "I must get out but I can't get out."107  Levinas's answer to this problem, to how 
being escapes its own imprisonment, is the ethical command of the Other whose arrival 
is an interruption of immanence and the original source of meaning: 
Is not the evil of suffering—extreme passivity, helplessness, abandonment, and 
solitude—also the unassumable whence the possibility of a half opening, and, 
more precisely, the half opening that a moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh slips 
through—the original call for aid, for curative help, help from the other me whose 
alterity, whose exteriority promises salvation?108 
At this stage, identity remains formal: I am I.  There is not yet the opening of discourse 
and meaning that instantiates the responsible subject, because there is not yet "you." 
                                                
105 Interestingly, it is not coincidental that as torture and suffering for Levinas signals an originary 
threshold of being, an inescapable limit through which we depart with the help of another, the same is true 
for Giorgio Agamben and his concept of the bare life in the camp who is exposed to the absoluteness of 
law, made mere zoe.  A reduction, or unraveling, of subjectivity to the level of bodily existence-as-pain 
conjoins these two accounts, despite hailing different intellectual traditions. 
106 To further elaborate, there is no recourse to death because, for Levinas, this cannot be a kind of 
transcendence.  When one dies, there is no subject left, no subject after transcendence. Since 
transcendence is the movement of being, and not its negation, and because death negates the subject, 
death cannot be the event which frees the Self from immanence, because it was not freed to somewhere 
else. 
107 Perpich 2008, 33 
108 Levinas 1998b,  93 
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The Face of the Other and Alterity 
 The Face of the Other, for Levinas, is not simply a metaphor, but the real, 
concrete face of another person.  It functions as the fulcrum upon which much of his 
thought turns, for a few related reasons109.  Perhaps underlying all of these reasons is 
the fact that the Face of the Other speaks.  Unlike mere objects, inanimate and part of 
the environment, the Face commands language by being the source of language.110  
The argument here is that I am not given to the World with language having been 
already installed in me.  Rather, it is given to me, allocated to me by the Other.  Such an 
argument is the simple recognition that I am spoken to, taught language and speech, by 
the Other.  My first words are not of my own freedom, but elicited from me.  This is a 
concise way of quickly getting to Levinas's now-famous argument:  that "I" am actually 
not a subject proper, until I am addressed by an Other.  I am addressed as moi, in the 
accusative, and only then can I respond as "I" afterwards.  The first grammatical case is 
not nominative, but vocative. 
 Even here, I can begin to briefly put Levinas in dialogue with the practice of 
identity politics.  An identity's content is not a pre-objective unity or essence, but it is 
content that is produced in the moment of response to the Other who asks "Who are 
you?"  My identity arises not on the level of mere being, but as response.  In Levinas's 
story, I do not yet have my identity story proper until having been called out by the 
Other, singled out to justify my identity claim (and my freedom of identity).  My freedom 
                                                
109 Reasons include the opening up of discourse as ethical responsibility, as well as his important 
distinction between the saying and the said. 
110 In Derrida's words, the Other as source of language is also the Other as the origin of World.  Origin 
here is understood as both the giver of World as well as its central coordinate.  All things in World are 
defined in relation not to Ego but the Other.  See Derrida 1980. 
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to make such a claim is immediately scored through with having to defend my freedom 
before the Other.  As Lisa Guenther argues, I defend my freedom by investing it in the 
ethical response to the Other.111 
 The Face, for Levinas, approaches me from a dimension of infinity, and we 
encounter this infinity because of the Face's capacity for language.  As an Other who is 
speaker, I can never fully grasp the Face through any sort of epistemology of ontology.  
In “its [the faceʼs] epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total 
resistance to the grasp," because any attempt at grasping the Face, any attempt to 
reduce it to something for me, is impossible; at any moment, the Face can speak and 
rupture any previous understanding or conception I had of her.112  As the source of 
language, the Face draws me out of immanence, out of mere being, by calling and 
singling me out among many.  Thus can Levinas say that the face is epiphany, for it is 
an event (the first event) that is overwhelming and sudden, which effectively shatters my 
world.  The Face shatters a pre-ontological solipsism.  To put concisely, I am not given 
to consciousnesses, but I (moi) am encountered, and it is this unpredictable encounter 
that represents the first moment for discourse.  He writes that “Better than 
comprehension, discourse relates with what remains essentially transcendent.”113 
 Important to keep in mind is how Levinas understood the structure of knowledge.  
Following, and refuting, his phenomenological predecessors, Levinas argues that the 
story of how the Ego obtains knowledge by positing himself against World and grasping 
its object, reducing that object to the plain of knowledge, is violent.  Knowledge, 
                                                
111 Personal correspondence. 
112 Levinas 1969, 197 
113 ibid 195 
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conceived in this way, is violent for Levinas because this grasp is necessarily for me, 
and yet the Other is never for me.  An object of knowledge is for me to control and 
regulate; knowledge possesses its object and denies it its independence.  However, 
because the Other is a subject who precedes my own emergence in the encounter, the 
Other is not something for me to possess, not something to be denied independence.  
The Face constantly evades the grasp of the Ego, and in this sense, approaches me 
from a dimension of infinity. 
 We can better understand this notion of an infinite Other by returning to 
storytelling.  For Levinas, the Face eludes grasping not because we cannot describe the 
face on the order of knowledge, but because every time we do so, there is still 
something more.  This is, in a similar way, how the act of storytelling cannot interiorize 
the moment of its narration, that storytelling cannot account for the here-and-now of its 
telling.  The Face is not an object that I patiently describe, an object for my knowing, but 
is my interlocutor, to whom I respond and engage in dialogue.  It is characterized by a 
kind of plenitude, which allows him to argue, "The face is present in its refusal to be 
contained.  In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed.”114  This is 
also how we might understand Levinas's use of "alterity."  Alterity is not the fact of mere 
difference between myself and Other, for even difference still maintains and 
presupposes a relation between myself and Other, which violates the infinity of the 
Other.  Only infinity can allow the Same to relate to the Other without everything 
collapsing into Sameness, for “the idea of infinity alone maintains the exteriority of the 
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other with respect to the same, despite this relation.”115  Without infinity, the mere 
relation between the Other and the Same establishes a relationship of relation which, for 
Levinas, represents an untenable relation, because mere relationality cannot sustain the 
alterity of the Other.   
Alterity, then, is that fact that the Other is more just an alter-ego of mine, whose 
only differences are because of the space and time between us.  Rather, alterity refers 
to the fact that the Other is irreducibly unique and separated from me, and does not 
exist only in relation to me.  Alterity is the very content of her being, which is to reiterate 
Levinas on how she "is a being and counts as such."116  She is not a being for me, and 
never will, for each time I try to contain her, she speaks and denies my attempt to 
encapsulate her.  She speaks and shows that there is always something more to her. 
Levinas continues, describing “the face of the Other [as] destitute,” and it “is the 
poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all…”117 The Face of the Other is 
destitute, nude, poor, because it resists ad infinitum contextualization.  It is not one of 
many objects in my vision, but breaks from the anonymity of mere being of everything 
else by capturing me, taking me hostage, with the first word in the vocative.  Thus, 
although it can be described as being a mere arrangement of a nose, a mouth, eyes, 
cheeks and forehead, the face is always something more—it is to whom I respond, who 
                                                
115ibid 196 
116 Peperzak 1996, 6 
117 Levinas 1985, 89 
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speaks and thus renders incomplete any account of her face by me, and who 
commands me to responsibility.118 
This notion of a subject being born not from freedom or ex nihilo, but born by 
being assigned responsibility by an Other, is perhaps the argument for which Levinas is 
most famous.  Here, we can recapitulate quickly the scene of address:  as a being in 
mere existence, I am called out by the Other in the vocative, I am addressed in the 
accusative, and I turn and respond as an "I" in the nominative.  The profundity of this 
argument should not be lost because of its simplicity.  Levinas is making the simple and 
important observation that language, sociality, our capacities for self-reflection, are not 
sprung for our mere fact of being.  Rather, these things inevitably happen when we are 
encountered by others.  We brush up against the Other, and are called out to respond, 
and in the act of response, we affirm the primacy of the Other.  Transcendence is the 
very act of being interrupted and drawn out to respond in this moment. 
As “The face speaks…it is in this that it renders possible and begins all 
discourse,”119 where the first word, or expression, uttered is the command: “you shall not 
commit murder.”120  The first expression by the Other must take the form of the dictum 
"do not murder" because she is "sole being I can wish to kill."121  This is again a 
provocative claim, but the argument for it is simply observant.  The Other, as a subject 
who represents the only thing I cannot possess and to reduce for me with knowledge, 
                                                
118 I think it is worth noting the etymological connection between "response" and "responsibility."  Both 
words come from the Latin word "respondere," which means "to respond."  The general idiomatic 
deployment of the word, however, is more than the mere practice "to respond."  It carries with it the 
meaning of "to answer," or, if we like, to justify. 
119 Levinas 1985, 87 
120 Levinas 1969, 199 
121 ibid 198 
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also is the only figure who threatens my mastery over the world.  As a subject who 
denies mastery, the Other renders precarious my own totalizing grasp.  As a 
consequence, the Other is also the only thing I could ever desire to murder, because 
she is the only thing which I can find threatening.122  But, language itself also 
presupposes a kind of pacifism, albeit even if only the most temporary kind.  After all, 
language is rendered somewhat ridiculous if before language is given, the Other has 
been murdered; discourse, as an act, becomes impossible in any proper sense.123  This 
pacifism is why the first expression of the Other is the command "do not kill me."  It is 
the underlying expression that underscores the very opening up of language itself, even 
as this expression is an accusation in the double sense.124 As the origin of our 
transcendence from mere being into subjectivity, Levinas poetically cites Dostoevsky 
"Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than others."125  We are 
all accused of killing the Other, and I more than others because I am here, now, 
addressed and positioned before her. 
It is this command, along with Levinas's emphasis on proximity, that grounds his 
argument for singularity.  This command, to which I must respond, is a command to me, 
not that person, but this me in the here-and-now.  The Other, by speaking to me, has 
singled me out, drawing me out of immanence and elicits response from me.  Diane 
                                                
122 It is helpful here to note how Levinas understands murder not as the mere damaging of bodily integrity. 
For Levinas, murder refers specifically to the killing of another subject. 
123 By proper sense, what I mean is that language does not refer to the simple act of speech.  Rather, it 
consists in speaking to someone, who presumably has the capacity to respond and answer.  Language is 
understood as discourse, and not mere sounds which lose any cogency and meaning without sociality. 
124 It is accusation because its predicate is, grammatically, in the accusative case, and it functions as 
accusation that charges me with the threat to murder the Other. 
125 Levinas 1998,146. 
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Perpich explicates singularity's meaning well by differentiating it from particularity and 
generality: 
But even the most original description of the face will inevitably be general, 
portable from once face to another; there is simply no way to do justice to the 
singularity of a face in a description… We negotiate the move from the particular 
to the general in every case of intentionally relating in an object that appears 
spatially or temporally… However, it is not particularity which is at issue here, but 
singularity, and the difference is crucial.  The idea that I can give a proper name 
to a tree as readily to a human being—even if we ordinarily have little call to do 
so—indicates the troubling fact that at a certain level language renders all others 
the same… Levinas's point is that…at the level of description, language 
seemingly cannot render the "fact" that in relation to a face I am in society with 
someone…the categories available to us in describing and understanding our 
world are unable to capture the crucial dimension of the social relationship 
between human beings.126 
 
Singularity denotes how the Other cannot be completely understood as a particular 
instance of a larger epistemology, or in relation to an overarching whole conception of 
the World, but exceeds and breaks away from any conclusive attempt to do so.  She is 
the Other, here-and-now before me with whom I am in a dynamic and unpredictable127 
                                                
126 Perpich 2008, 47-48 
127 Levinas's characterization of the Other is of an eschatological kind.  The Other who arrives and 
radically disrupts my being in general is like the coming of the Messiah; I can never anticipate the coming 
of the Other, and with her arrival, my world is shattered and transformed.  Thus, history is also not 
understood as synchronic, but diachronically constituted by the arrival of the Other which repeatedly 
draws me away from the past, and who signals a break from history. 
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dialogue.  She signifies not knowledge in a system, but rather singularity that assumes 
the form of the unique ethical relationship between us. 
We can be even more concrete here by looking at the cultural function of 
assigning a proper name to a child when she is born.  At birth, the child is given over to 
language and sociality by way of designating the child with a "sign" that binds the 
individual to her idiomatic representation.  It is this assigning of the proper name that 
presents the child into the field of language, of positioning the child into a sociality where 
she is perpetually dependent on others.  Levinas might say that this naming, despite 
how many individuals might share the same name, still designates this subject, and not 
that other.128  That is, our common practice of assigning proper names represents one 
dimension of how we come to denote the singularity of each one of us.129 
Thus, Levinas argues that my subjectivity is assigned to me by the command of 
the Other, and this is a command that does not work within the level of freedom.  I do 
not choose whether this command is dispensed or not, for it precedes my own agency.  
                                                
128 An underemphasized nuance in Levinas's own work is his choice of using alterity.  Etymologically, 
there are two words that refer to the concept of "other," and it is the latin adjective alterus and alius.  The 
former designates the other of two with great specificity, whereas the latter designates a generic other 
among many.  The proper name designates alterity in that it is not an other in general, but a very specific 
and concrete other who is this other.   
129 Etienne Balibar goes into greater detail about the act of naming, drawing from Derrida although not in 
a Levinasian context: "the proper name [is] precisely not originarily one of the language's signs.  On 
account of this fact it is not possible to say rigorously that the subject of the language 'belongs' to the 
language linguistically.  That he is constantly reinscribed here, for example in the form of the signature, 
testifies to the fact that the language operates as a power of dissemination of statements or indefinite 
transformation of meaning, in other terms as a generalized ecriture and not as the 'expression' of a 
universe of thought."  The significance of "naming" someone, and the need to reiterate and reinscribe the 
name is thus a way of fixing the individual's singularity in place, in light of the dynamic discursive field of 
sociality.  That is, we give names that themselves are not original signs within a language as a way of 
bringing the subject into the world rooted and oriented with perspective, and not lost and anomalous; to 
transpose back into Levinasian language for my own argument, it is an act of the Other which brings me 
from being in general to a subjected individuated by the Other, now given grounds for meaning and 
language by the Other.  In 1995 "Culture and Identity (Working Notes)" from The Identity in Question 185-
186. 
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The command that "assigns the Self to be a Self," assigns this me to be a responsible 
I.130 To recapitulate, the responsibility we are describing here is a responsibility based 
outside of my self while also being in my self; it is always being archived and installed in 
me without completion and without knowledge, and therefore not directly accessible.  
When I speak of an identity politics that encourages identity formation alongside 
responsibility, this is the sense of responsibility to which I refer.   
I do have the agency to choose how I respond to the Other, even though I never 
properly chose to do so.  It is in this moment of response to the command that, as our 
account of storytelling also affirms, a space for meaning is created.  Meaning for the 
Ego, and meaning for identity, erupts precisely in my ethical gesture towards the Other 
who elicited my response.  My response might be silence, ignoring, storytelling, support, 
or any kind of action.  But it is a response to an ethical demand, a demand that 
provokes and conditions my response.  This scene of address is unfolding within an 
ethical modality, and because I am called to respond to the Other, to justify my freedom 
before her, she founds freedom as responsibility.  My freedom, my very Ego, is called 
into question, and I am taken hostage by the vocative interdiction and demanded to 
justify my very freedom by being responsible for her; "The self is through and through a 
hostage, older than the ego, prior to principles."131 
 To foreshadow the next chapter, I first suggest here that storytelling is one kind of 
response.  It represents a response of justification for one's freedom of identity, a 
justification elicited by the Other, who in our speech together asked "Who are you?"  If 
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identity does not stem from an eternal essence, but is a product of willful construction 
through storytelling (reiterated and 'put into play' by identity claims), then we might 
understand identity proper as being elicited by the Other who first encounters me.  And, 
importantly, it is in storytelling's act as the ethical gesture towards the Other that 
generates meaning for my identity, puts my 'identity' in society.  Trapped in the 
formalistic "I am I," caught in the suffering of mere being, it is in the movement from this 
formal solipsism to ethically being-for-the-other that we find meaning. 
 Elaborating on the dimension of infinite responsibility is crucial to understanding 
how identity politics can be rearticulated as a politics of ethics and responsibility.  As the 
Other forces me to respond, drawing me into an ethical relationship in there here-and-
now before my interlocutor, we must understand that her demands are not coercive.  
These commands to responsibility are not backed by threat or force.  Rather, my 
responsibility towards the Other is revealed as a trace in my act of saying.132 As the 
faceʼs ethical relation concretely assumes the form of language, Levinas distinguishes 
between the saying and the said in order to prevent this recourse to language from 
slipping back into the order of knowledge. Precisely because the ethical relationship is 
beyond knowledge, and yet assumes itself through discourse, Levinas argues that he 
has “always distinguished…between the saying and the said [where] the saying must 
bear a said [as] a necessity of the same order as that which imposes a society with 
laws, institutions and social relations.” The two are intimately related, and yet 
distinguishable, for only the said operates in the realm of knowledge.  The saying 
remains fundamentally ethical.  The saying is the opening up of the said, which is why 
                                                
132 See Ethics and Infinity 88. 
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the face-to-face is the opening up of ethics.  Only in an encounter with the Face of the 
Other am I forced to respond, and I must respond with language.    
Continuing a differentiation between the saying and the said, Levinas argues 
“saying is the fact that before the face I do not simply remain there contemplating it, I 
respond to it.  The saying is a way of greeting the Other.”133  Here, we might formulate 
his argument to say that, as a matter of fact, I do not and cannot stand before an Other 
without having been already given over to response.  I can stand before her and remain 
silent, and thus convey a kind of response.  I can begin speech, offer a gift, or—in the 
case of late modern identity politics—I can tell a story to justify myself before her.  
However, in the act of saying I already reveal that the Other has passed my way and 
has left her unrepresentable trace in my having responded.  My having been assigned 
responsibility is not recoverable as an operation of memory, then.  Responsibility was 
pressed upon me in an anarchic past, in a kind of pre-history, if we understand history to 
be a retroactive process of signification and meaning-construction.  One does not reflect 
and find the moment of responsibility in a personal history, because the act of self-
reflection already presupposes having been encountered by an Other, forced and put 
into question by an Other.  Even in doubt and skepticism in the face of responsibility, I 
reveal the trace of the Other in myself.   
 In short, my "freedom" to speak already illuminates my having been encountered 
by the Other and assigned responsibility.  I speak because I am called to justify myself, 
and as I try to make good on this justification, the Other—as my interlocutor—continues 
to press me for justification, drawing me towards the limit of my own Self.  I justify my 
                                                
133 Levinas 1985, 88 
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freedom by taking on the ethical relationship assigned to me, denoting my own 
singularity as well.  By giving over to response, I show that I have already been 
assigned "to be a Self," a responsible je who has been challenged to invest his freedom 
in an ethical relationship.134   
 
The Dwelling of the Self 
 Levinas's account of the dwelling and the home represents a topic that serves as 
a compelling bridge between our response towards others and the consolidation of 
identity because, as I see it, they both concern an interactive scene where a Self 
becomes constitutively exposed to an Other (to use Cavarero's language).  In the 
chapter "The Dwelling" in Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes: 
The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human 
activity, but in being its condition, and in this sense its commencement.  The 
recollection necessary for nature to be able to be represented and worked over, 
for it to first take form as a world, is accomplished as the home.  Man abides in 
the world as having come to it from a private domain, from being at home with 
himself, to which at each moment he can retire… Concretely speaking the 
dwelling is not situated in the objective world, but the objective world is situated 
by relation to my dwelling [emphasis added].135 
                                                
134 Important to note is that part of my "freedom" is to kill the Other.  Thus, part of my commitment to the 
ethical relationship is a commitment to not kill the Other, to justify my freedom to murder at my whim by 
holding myself back—that is, to be responsible. 
135 Levinas 1969, 152-153 
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The dwelling, for Levinas, is a presupposed space that allows a being to contemplate 
the world; it is a space of withdrawal in which a person is "at home with himself," 
comfortable and secure.  By putting up walls, and shoring up the barriers of his dwelling, 
the Ego shuts himself from the harsh elements of the World.  Having constructed the 
boundaries of the dwelling, the Ego maintains his possessions while hiding safely from 
the world within this home136.  Here, in the home, there is not yet an "Other," in any 
ethical sense (a claim which will be problematized with the welcoming Feminine shortly).  
In Levinas's narrative about subject formation (at least in Totality and Infinity), "the 
isolation of the home does not arouse magically, does not 'chemically' provoke 
recollection, human subjectivity," but rather "recollection, a work of separation, is 
concretized as existence in the dwelling, economic existence."137  In identity politics, this 
isolation in the home, in a sense, is being at home in one's own 'identity.' We have 
sufficiently problematized the term "identity," so that I think it necessary to reiterate here 
that the shoring up of dwelling in Levinas requires constant effort.  I am not referring 
here to a stable and immutable term 'identity', when I draw connections between identity 
and dwelling.  Both require effort to maintain, and both are dynamic, but identity's given 
anomalous and dynamic state does not prevent us from intelligibly using it in our 
analysis.  
                                                
136 Tina Chanter has compellingly shown how the dwelling is constituted by an invisible exploitation of the 
Feminine in Levinas's work in a lecture given at Vanderbilt University in the Spring of 2008.  Although this 
problem is a significant one, which unsettles and disturbs Levinas's claim that the dwelling is maintained 
only by repelling the elements, there is not space here to delve too deeply.  It will suffice to say, as I will 
later allude to briefly, that the problem of the Feminine in Levinas's account of dwelling likely translates 
over to a problem  with the constitution of identity in late-modern identity politics as well.  An example that 
immediately come to mind is the consolidation of "masculine" modes of identity in public spaces through 
the unspoken reliance on female labor in the private "dwelling." 
137 Levinas 1969, 153-154 
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On one level, albeit incomplete, the consolidation of the dwelling is an 
inaugurating event of the subject.  It is being comfortable in one's own personal sphere 
(indeed, for Levinas, in one's own skin) because we have not yet been put into question 
by the Other.  Thus, in the Levinasian story, the dwelling is the place in which we 
contemplate the world, but it is necessarily an incomplete inauguration of subjectivity 
because no matter how well the subject has shored up his dwelling, it is always 
vulnerable to the arrival of the Other.  In his account of the dwelling, the home or shelter 
is a place where at any moment, and completely unanticipated, the Other might knock 
on my door and announce her arrival.  She arrives and despite my own desire to escape 
from the elements, I cannot help but to respond to her arrival.  I can keep the door shut, 
or I can let her into my own dwelling.  This is not abstract speculation on Levinas's part, 
but a specific articulation of his own historical moment.  As I read his passage on 
dwelling, I cannot help but mentally re-enact the person in Germany who is protected 
within his own house.  As he moves about, solipsistic and unaware of any Others while 
mired in his own self-sustaining activities, his "economy of being,"138 he hears a knock 
on his door.  As he opens the door, he find that it is his neighbor, a stranger 
nonetheless, a woman who requires protection in his own dwelling from the SSI.  The 
dwelling is thus not a metaphor for my identity in an anomalous and ambiguous sense, 
but a fairly concrete metaphor for my ethical identity; that is, what Levinas might call 
subjectivity proper. 
The fact that at any moment, the Other might arrive at my door unanticipated and 
require my response, points towards the insecure and slippery qualities of my dwelling.  
                                                
138 Levinas 1969, 166 
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It is, thus, incomplete in the sense that my dwelling, before my being interrupted by the 
Other, is precariously vulnerable and exposed.  Connolly might complement Levinas's 
account here by suggesting that dwelling is not constituted only in relation to the harsh 
elements.  The dwelling, now understood as my identity, is consolidated against evil 
others.  Those who are barbaric, primitive, abnormal, and sick are the harshness of the 
world in which I withdraw by shoring up the walls of my own identity and, in turn, 
establish those outside my dwelling as defined by my very act of exclusion.  The 
building of the walls of the dwelling are cemented and arranged by our identity claims.  
The arrival of this concrete Other, who interrupts my solipsism and commands me to 
help her, thus puts me into question by demanding that I justify my action.  Do I open 
the door, or do I shut her out?  Why do I shut her out?  No matter my action, I must 
respond as a subject who has now been inaugurated as a responsible subject, who had 
no say in whether this responsibility was placed or not.  I am unsettled, no longer at 
home with myself, with the interruption of the Other. 
For my coming argument, it is important at this juncture to introduce and work 
through a critique aimed at Levinas and his account of the dwelling.  This critique, first 
instigated by Luce Irigaray139 and elaborated by others140, is the role of the welcoming 
Feminine whose presence in the dwelling is yet not that of an Other that is recognized 
as an ethical relation.  This is a relationship that is not acknowledged, but a relationship 
that makes possibly my autonomy that can later be placed into question by the stranger.  
Levinas writes: 
                                                
139 Irigaray 2003 
140 Tina Chanter in lecture at Vanderbilt University in Spring 2008. 
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The Beloved…the feminine, essentially violable and inviolable, the "Eternal 
Feminine," is the virgin or an incessant recommencement of virginity…the Virgin 
remains ungraspable, dying without murder, swooning, withdrawing into her 
future, beyond every possible promised to anticipation.  Alongside of the night as 
anonymous rustling of the there is extends the night of the erotic, behind the 
night of insomnia…"141 
That the "Eternal Feminine" is not yet an other is signaled by her comparison to the il y 
a, the "there is" of mere anonymous being.  A rustle in the night, a not-yet within the 
realm of anonymity, she is a figure whom my "caress aims at neither person nor a 
thing."142 
 As his critics have indicated, it is precisely this figure, who is neither person nor 
thing because no ethical relation exists, that maintains and provides for me in my 
dwelling.  My mother, who gives me into the world, names me, and calls me into being, 
nurtures me and takes care of me until I can stand on my own and, later, be put into 
question by the stranger and his command to be responsible.  The dwelling, then, is not 
just consolidated against the elements.  It is made warm and comforting because of an 
Other who I do not yet recognize as such.  In short, we are cared for before we can care 
for someone else.   
 What Levinas fails to do here is to continue drawing forth the account of the 
dwelling into his account of politics.  The dwelling here describes more than just my 
adult egoism being interrupted.  It is, in fact, a metaphor for the development of my 
                                                
141 Levinas 1969, 258 
142 ibid 259 
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embryonic identity.  Unlike the Liberal and Foucaultian notions of identity, this ethical 
identity relies on others to prop me up so that I can care for others. There are, then, two 
modes of otherness in Levinas's story of subject formation, and this story is neither 
Liberalism's autonomous subject nor Connolly's oppositional subject.  The role of these 
two modes of otherness, the "Feminine" and the "Stranger" will serve as the centerpiece 
of my analysis of storytelling to come. 
For Levinas, and this is the important lesson at this stage of analysis, to "become 
oneself" requires more than simply having a dwelling or identity.  Rather, "becoming 
oneself" generates meaning, represents the full sense of my subjectivity's first moment, 
when I open that door and answer the Other.  Becoming oneself is an affective process.  
In that ethical gesture, the "I" is inaugurated by opening up one's identity to the 
demands of the Other, to listen to her plea, and to negotiate the very walls of my own 
identity in response.  Put slightly differently, my very opening up to the Other is the 
reorganization and rearrangement of "who I am."  This ethical gesture refers to the 
interruption by the Other, to the transition from an anonymous being to a responsible 
subject, properly and fully constituted.  The inauguration of identity here is conceived 
not in opposition to the Other, as late-modern identity politics facilitates and encourages, 
but as the very opening up of myself to the Other, my being-for-the-Other.  Humbled 
before her alterity, my 'identity' emerges in my meaningful ethical gesture towards her 
command.  She elicits my response and draws me out of my dwelling and into society 
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with her within this ethical drama.143  The movement from "I am I" to "I am for you" is the 
original eruption of meaning.  
 A few possible concerns about Levinas's account of ethical self-formation can be 
addressed here.  The first is the worry that being in general, or mere being for Levinas, 
sounds curiously similar to the "state of nature" concepts in political theorists like Locke 
and Hobbes.  That is, both might initially seem to describe some kind of pre-social, pre-
political hypothetical world, and that methodologically, we are deriving ethical questions 
from a hypothetical fiction and thus incur all of the problems of doing this kind of 
idealized normative theory.  However, to characterize Levinas's starting point, of being 
in general, as a state of nature is to miss how Levinas understands sociality.  Being in 
general for Levinas is not a state of nature, with a war of all against all, as it is in 
Hobbes' case.  Rather, it is more akin to being in a large crowd, walking down the street, 
and being in a kind of mental paralysis that one approaches in insomnia or fatigue.  
Levinas's mere existant here melds into the crowd, anonymous and faceless, just 
another figure among many other equally shifty, anonymous beings.  Then, as one is 
mindlessly walking on the sidewalk, someone from behind calls out to you.  And, all of a 
sudden, one turns around and finds herself faced by a singular and concrete Other.  At 
the same time, one's being called out to respond changes the perception of the crowd 
dramatically.  No longer am "I" anonymously flowing through the crowd, but all of a 
                                                
143 Here, we return to Caverero's notion of subjects being "constitutively exposed."  To have subjectivity 
proper for Cavarero is to be a narratable self to an other, and to be able to have that story told back to me 
by an other.  To be a subject is to already have been exposed to those around me, to subjects who 
perceive my actions and can assemble those actions into a story about me.  Otherwise, there is no 
possibility for my own self-reflection which attempts to create a momentarily united "I" who is discursively 
held together by one's own story. 
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sudden, I stand apart from the crowd, because I have been singled out by this person 
before me; and yet, importantly, I am still in the crowd, too. 
 This is not a state of nature that Levinas is describing, but a political existence 
that lacks orientation, lacks perspective, where the borders between myself and my 
environment is ambiguous and volatile:  the borders of myself are vague and ill-defined 
in relation to the crowd.  Theories of states of nature do not capture this crucial social 
dimension along with the scenes of address.  In contrast to the idealized abstraction of 
states of nature, Levinas's being in general describes a concrete description of what it 
means to be individuated in society with others, where I am vulnerable to the address of 
others who unsettles me, prevents me from being at home with myself (walking 
mindlessly through the crowd, hiding safely within my 'identity').  It is a an account of a 
particular type of sociality, one that we do not "remember" because it precedes the 
operation of memory, but a kind of sociality we can approach in places like dense 
crowds, insomnia, fatigue, and torture.  It is not, on my reading, a pre-political sociality, 
but it is indeed a sociality with no ethical singularity, and it is this crucial difference 
between ambiguous and unguided politics versus a politics oriented by ethical 
singularity that is important.  Instead of deploying some kind of social contract (Locke, 
Hobbes, Rawls), or a strictly theological account of the birth of political sociality 
(Aquinas and Augustine), or even transcendental reason (Hegel), Levinas is using the 
concrete here-and-now of the Other to signal the shift from anomalous sociality to one 
with concrete actors relating to one another within an ethical modality.  We might 
understand the "event" of the Other's arrival to be Levinas's version of the social 
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contract, because it acts as the pivot between two kinds of societies, even though the 
society on either side of the pivot is radically different for Levinas than other 
contractarian or theological political theorists.  
 A possible additional concern is one that I have already started to address, but it 
is worth recapitulating:  this is the concern of the moral skeptic.  Why should I be 
responsible for others?  Nothing Levinas has said has convinced me why moral claims 
by others should have any binding force outside of prudential or utilitarian concerns.  To 
the moral skeptics argument, I think Diane Perpich is right to point us towards Levinas's 
account of moral conscience.144 In order to even ask the question of whether I am 
responsible or not, I have already shown myself to have been opened up to the world by 
an Other.  Perpich writes: 
When the skeptic asks "Why be moral" or "What is the other to me?" she 
demands a reason for acting in one way rather than another.  Far from casting 
doubt on the possibility of ethical life through such questions, skepticism is in fact 
its prolongation.  It is the enactment of ethical life.  If it were not for the other who 
opens the world to me, I would not be able meaningfully to ask the skeptic's 
question.  Thus, being chosen before I can choose is the condition for all of my 
later choosing, for all my affirming or denying.  I cannot without contradiction 
deny my ability to engage in the process of critical reflection, and, by extension, I 
cannot without contradiction deny my exposure to the other.145 
                                                
144 Perpich 2008, 140-145 
145 ibid 145 
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Moral conscience, understood as the capacity to reflect on questions of ethics and 
morality, already betrays the trace of the Other within the Self.  Moral conscience, the 
interior and deep hollows within my mind, are hollows created by my reflexive critical 
thought, but the inaugurating event for this interiority is my freedom having been called 
into question by the Other.  I question my freedom and myself because the other has 
put me into question, and as I continue to question myself, I develop, mature, and give 
birth to what we might call a moral conscience.  The skeptic, then, is already engaged in 
ethical inquiry and living ethics, even as he seeks to evade it (as he does never).   
There still remains a concern, however:  even if I am shown to have been 
assigned responsibility that founded my own freedom and agency by the Other, this is 
certainly a weak sense of "responsibility."  This is responsibility as almost nothing more 
than a literal capacity to "respond."  This final concern demands elaborate attention 
because it lies at the crux of questions of normativity, and thus will be the subject of the 
next and final chapter.  What we need is an account of how Levinas might substantively 
challenge identity groups in identity politics to invest their freedom as social 
responsibility and justice towards others, and thus give us an entirely new account of 
what identity might mean, how It is consolidated, and what communities emerge from its 
articulation. 
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IV.  Me Voici – The Hero and the Bard 
 
Rei Ayanami:  Who am I?  Ayanami Rei.  Who are you?  Ayanami Rei.  You are 
               also Ayanami Rei?  Yes, the thing called Ayanami Rei.  All these 
     are the things called Ayanami Rei.  Why are all of these me? 
    Because Others call us Ayanami Rei.  Why do you (I) have a false 
    mind and false body? 
 Rei Ayanami:  They are not false, for I am I… 
Rei Ayanami:  You are a false object pretending to be human.  Look, you have a 
    dark, invisible, and unintelligible presence within you… 
      Rei Ayanami, Neon Genesis Evangelion 
 
 In order to work through the problems presented by the ethical conundrum and 
its dependency on the identity claim "We are," I use the practice of storytelling and 
narration in this chapter to argue that storytelling is the political act which generates 
meaning for identity in politics, and that its theoretical structure betrays its function as 
ethical response before the Other.  By illuminating this ethical dimension of storytelling 
and departing further from the thought of Levinas, I set up my argument to examine the 
ethical dimensions of identity formation that allow us to articulate a new theoretical 
framework for identity politics that centralizes the role of responsibility in identity 
formation.  I examine storytelling because it is a practice that is prevalent in late-modern 
identity politics, as well as phenomenon that, upon scrutiny, represents a constitutive 
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project of identity formation.  I argue these points by first using a case study of taxicab 
drivers in downtown Nashville, and then by moving through literary theoretical 
digressions.  The aim is to examine why we tell stories and how meaning generated 
from stories erupts from the relationship practice of storytelling.  
In downtown Nashville, TN, in the United States, there is a growing social 
movement picking up considerable movement in late 2008 and early 2009.  This social 
movement involves the exploitation of the taxi cab drivers both socially and 
economically.  The mechanisms of their exploitation are complex, and are the products 
of the intersection of their poor economic position, cultural and language barriers, prolific 
nationalisms that demonize immigrants, and the politics of an unpopular war.  To 
simplify a difficult situation, their plight can be described in the following way:  most of 
the taxi cab drivers in Nashville, TN are immigrants from east Africa and the Middle 
East.  They hail from places as disparate as Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, and 
Jordan.  Forced to immigrate from their respective homes, and too often because of 
increasing political instability directly due to U.S. foreign policy, some ironically come to 
the United States in search of new homes.  Nashville is designated as one of many 
refugee "dump sites" in the country, where newly admitted immigrants into the country 
are sent for settlement; the city consequently has a robust Somalian, Afghani, and 
Iranian community. 
Many of the (male) immigrants find jobs as taxi cab drivers.  Through conducted 
interviews by local University students, these drivers reveal that they work twelve to 
sixteen hours a day, driving their taxi.  In order to operate a taxi as a licensed driver, the 
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men are contracted under a larger taxicab company (in Nashville, the largest company 
is Allied Cab) who offers to the drivers a license (just a sticker that pastes onto their 
windows) for a weekly fee ranging from $250 to $300.  Only with owning the license can 
the taxicab drivers work in a recognized employed capacity (given a meter, 
communication hook-ups, and GPS navigators).  Despite driving for twelve to sixteen 
hours a day, the taxicab drivers are barely able to make ends meet at the end of each 
week after paying their license fee.  Many drivers lament that their income barely keeps 
their family fed.  Their hours prevent them from spending time with their children, which 
only increases their frustration.  The magnitude of difficulty varies between each of the 
drivers, but their collective exploitation has driven the Nashville taxicab drivers to 
(attempt to) coalesce into some form of union for collective bargaining. Unfortunately, 
language barriers prevented them from formally organizing until late 2008; many of 
them still speak broken English at best, because their work hours prevent them from 
attending the English instruction programs for immigrants, hosted by local community 
activists.  In addition, their long workdays prevent them from dedicating too much time 
to organization and lobbying for higher wages.  Although the current mayor, Karl Dean, 
has promised to spend a day "as a taxi-cab driver," in order to learn more of their plight 
(due to pressure from social workers and activists), no report has indicated that he has 
yet made good on his promise.146 
Although slow to organize, the culturally and linguistically diverse taxi-cab drivers 
managed to organize themselves efficiently enough to enlist the help of local university 
social justice organizations, as well as the broader community advocacy group Jobs For 
                                                
146 This is as of February 11, 2009 
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Justice.  Their first request for the activists:  to create a public (political) front for the taxi-
cab drivers for the purposes of applying pressure to the local government as well as to 
have an identity with which to tell a story about their collective plight.  This story, 
constructed from the diverse and somewhat fragmented experiences of the drivers, in 
combination with their new political front (image, really) would be used to make claims 
for economic justice on behalf of their new identity as well as mobilize their constituents.  
What they sought was not assistance in any project of collective bargaining.  Rather, 
they sought to invent a cogent identity with which we, the students, could tell their 
stories and press their claims of identity.147  We did this through the creation of a 
pamphlet (with a front cover featuring a lone Afghani man looking out at the street; he 
had become the face of the movement) that featured excerpts from their stories that 
wove into a larger narrative about their collective exploitation. 
There are several elements of this account worth exploring, but they are tied 
together through the act of storytelling.  These stories, these canvasses of selfhood, 
these little accounts of subjectivities… Let us proceed with two thoughts:  we forge 
identities in order that we become intelligible, so that self-recognition and recognition by 
others becomes possible (even if this process is, at the moment, conceived in ethically 
violent ways because of the identity claim), and we tell stories in identity politics.  What 
is the role the storytelling and narration, of listening and recanting anecdotes and 
mythologies, in the analysis of late-modern identity politics previously outlined?  
Somehow, in our obsession with using identities as essentializing weapons, as 
                                                
147 The transcripts of the student interviews reveal a consistent deployment of "The taxi cab drivers are…" 
and "We drivers are…" That is, they were invoking the "We are…" identity claim. 
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weapons that reduce the "they" to for us, we forgot why we tell stories about these 
identities in the first place.  The notion of the Liberal subject, which provides so much of 
the theoretical infrastructure for identity politics, has few important things to say about 
storytelling, except perhaps that storytelling is just another weapon individuals can use 
to reduce others for us, or as some form of deliberation and argumentation, or what 
have you.  (Feminists such as Iris Marion Young tend to treat storytelling in much less 
aggressive manners, although the thought still remains that storytelling is for 
deliberation)148.  The notion of the Foucaultian subject, and the diverse thinkers and 
traditions that reject the notion of the subject ex nihilo, although to a lesser extent than 
the Liberal subject, attend less to why we tell a story, then what story and within which 
regimes of truth and power, do we tell these stories.   
Why our relationships with others open up the possibility of language, why we tell 
stories, and why these stories are so integral to our subject formation and the 
congealment of collective identity—these are not incidental questions, but rather 
questions that pull us towards a possibility built into identity politics:  the possibility of a 
non-violent ethics, of a new political ethics which denies the seemingly inexorable logic 
of the "they" being for us. 
How has diverting our attention away from why we tell stories in identity politics 
enabled its actors to shape its agenda and organizing principles?  Its actors, which I 
think often includes many of us, are engaging in a politics largely informed by the 
historical and intellectual traditions of the Foucaultian and Liberal subjects.  "We" collect 
                                                
148 Young 1996 
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ourselves into collective identities to make claims of group rights149, of nature or biology, 
claims of culture and tradition; we collect ourselves to make claims of identity on behalf 
of "us," and in that act inaugurate the very "us" which tried to lay that claim.  It is thus a 
process that is more than a discursive or rhetorical move—more because the claim itself 
is an attempt at inaugurating a new identity, and the success of its recognition (largely 
dependent on the prevailing regimes of truth) provides new modes of being and 
embodiment.  People do not simply adopt new labels for the sake of a new label.  
Rather, these new labels recursively offer new vectors upon which their can identities 
mature and unfold.  We can collect ourselves into collective identities because many of 
us still, whether consciously or not, rely on the fictional artifact from the Liberal subject 
tradition that says that collective groups can be reduced to singular juridical/legal 
subject, with no serious issues of inner tension or ambiguity.  
That the structure and process of storytelling is, to a large extent, left out of the 
theoretical edifices of late-modern identity politics mutely points us towards a critical 
investigation into how identity politics might transform were the implications and 
challenges that storytelling offers be taken seriously.   
Foregrounding the story of the taxicab drivers prompts a few related questions:  
is this identity politics?  Why do they insist on telling us stories, and what is the role of 
storytelling in relation to identity and responsibility?  I argue that what this is indeed a 
particular kind of identity politics—the identity politics that relies on "We are…" claims.  I 
also wish to argue, however, that storytelling is not unique to this form of identity politics, 
                                                
149 Will Kymlicka, Three Forms of Group Citizenship in Canada provides, perhaps, the standard example 
of liberalism's attempt at conjoining individualism with the concept of "group rights."  See Kymlicka 1996. 
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but is a critical part of identity congealment and subject formation.  Then, I intend to 
analyze why the taxicab driver movement is not gaining ground, and explain that their 
inefficacy is due to identity politics' current weak commitment to responsibility.  One of 
the goals, then, is to help the taxicab drivers by articulating new rules and mores of 
identity politics so that coalition building, reaching across boundaries of identity, and 
letting identity's anomalous nature, can be a source of responsibility. 
 
Are They Doing Late-Modern Identity Politics? 
First, can we characterize this politics as late-modern identity politics, as 
opposed to a superficial form of collective bargaining—a kind of strategic politics with 
weak commitments to constituting a new community?  If collective bargaining is 
understood as a strategy that simply increases the chances or probability of the 
individual members achieving their goals, we might be tempted to answer in the 
affirmative.  After all, are the taxicab drivers not simply collaborating to try to get 
increased financial security with higher wages and employment benefits?  We might 
think that they are not trying to establish some new way of being, but they just want 
higher wages, and thus dismiss their efforts as largely unrelated to identity politics. 
Although this thought might be applicable to some forms of collective bargaining, 
labeling the taxi-cab driver movement as simply strategic politics ends up being overly 
reductive of their investment in the movement, in the goals and aims of their efforts, and 
in the consequences of their politics.  Yes, the cab drivers may have been prompted to 
work together because of individualist desires for securing better lives for themselves.  
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But their desire to work together, to overcome their language differences, to contact 
external groups to help them create a story and push for wage reform—this is not just 
an effort to increase their probability of success.  The request to have some form of 
political front, to have an "official story" about the movement indicates that they sought 
to, however temporarily, establish a new political community in order to make claims of 
identity.  That the drivers sought to create a pamphlet, with the lone Afghani man on the 
front page, is not an innocuous detail.  It points towards a desire to create—willfully—the 
pretense of a more unitary community, the "We," in order to declare "We are…" The 
lone man on the front cover serves to nudge the reader towards falsely thinking and 
interfacing with their collective efforts as the efforts of that singular man.  The (also 
singular) story in the pamphlet—the story of the taxicab drivers—is the lonely 
monologue of the man on the front cover.  Despite their laudable efforts at fighting for 
higher wages, we might raise an eyebrow at this forceful creation of the unified story 
written in the pamphlet, behind the solitary face of the Afghani man. 
Collective bargaining and identity politics need not be mutual exclusives; 
oftentimes collective bargaining shifts into identity politics, and sometimes identity 
politics might transform into collective bargaining.  The efforts of creating a "post-
partisan" political community in early 2009 in the U.S. hastily degenerated, amidst 
discussion over an enormous financial stimulus package for the economy, into collective 
bargaining and interest-based politics.  A new political community, which was the initial 
aim of many political actors, was scrapped only a couple of weeks into negotiation.  
Once the goal of creating a new political community was scrapped, we might say that 
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this politics shifted into collective bargaining.  However, at the same time, the collective 
bargaining largely took the form of congressional Democrats against Republicans—
identity groups in their own right.  Thus, although collective bargaining and identity 
politics might be differentiated in terms of their relationship to community, the 
relationship between the two is dynamic and intimate.  For the purposes of 
understanding the cab drivers, however, I venture to say that the concept of "collective 
bargaining" does not accomplish much work as an analytical tool, and that the way to 
approach their efforts is through an analysis of identity politics.   
The leaders of the drivers, who came to speak to the university students and 
activists, decided to rely on claims of identity, "We are…", as their tool for improving 
their situation.  They sought to make claims based on injury, and consolidated their 
identity around this injury.  They sought to create the image of a univocal community 
with an equally univocal story behind their mascot of the singular man.  "Listen to us, 
listen to our monologue of the We."  Thus, they also constituted an antagonistic 
community with which to oppose themselves, in binary opposition.  "You are…" remains 
mutely tethered to their politics.  This is the identity politics of late modernity.  The "We" 
here refers to the identity group of taxicab drivers, and the "They" is the Nashville 
government, Allied Cab, and all who collude to sustain their exploitation. 
I realize that I am treading on tenuous grounds, and risk sounding radically 
counter-productive.  Isn't a huge part of the problem that nobody is listening to the 
voices of the marginalized today in the first place?  Am I not critiquing their very desire 
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to be heard, critiquing their very desire to raise their voices and be taken seriously as 
political participants? 
As I intend to make clear, I am not critiquing their desire to be heard, to voice 
themselves in a polity that is deaf to their concerns and problems.  Too often the voices 
from the fringes of political space are violently suppressed, or their stories co-opted and 
rewritten to serve the interests of the elite150, or their voices turned into truths that serve 
to discipline and normalize those very same fringe voices151.  I simply want to use the 
particular methods of their identity politics to ask why it is they are not succeeding and 
to highlight what identity politics needs in order for the efforts of the taxicab drivers to be 
more successful: an account of responsibility towards others that cannot excuse itself 
because of exclusionary communities constituted by politicized difference. 
 
Why tell stories to us? 
 The fact that the taxicab drivers approached us with stories, and asked that we 
tell a story about their collective plight to the Mayor by weaving together a broader 
singular story about their exploitation, should not be surprising.  Storytelling often serves 
to bridge connections between people, to cultivate empathy and understanding between 
irreducibly unique lives and stories.  As a political act, storytelling builds communities 
while trying to connect that community to others.  Community events, like "Take Back 
                                                
150 The way that "common stories" in the United States are often used in electoral campaigns is a good 
example.  We need only to look at John Edwards' constant co-option of health care stories on the election 
campaign trail and the story of "Joe the plumber" for candidate John McCain to see ways in which stories 
are extracted and co-opted to serve elite interests, thus sustaining the silencing of weaker political 
voices—those of the electorate.  This phenomenon is not specific to the United States, but prolific in 
international political stages like the UN. 
151 Foucault 1988  
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the Night," where women who have experienced rape and abuse narrate their stories to 
the audience, are storytelling events that attempt to form and consolidate community, 
nurture intimacy among participants, and create grounds with which find context for their 
suffering.  Thus, in one sense, we might understand the taxicab drivers to be telling us 
their stories so that they could bridge their community to ours, to draw our attention 
towards their plight while binding our communities together more intimately.  This is 
what many feminists understand to be the goal of consciousness-raising152 and to be 
the solution to redressing social marginalization.  Storytelling is understood to be a form 
of activism and praxis, of a way of grounding theory while enriching our political 
dialogues and developing kinship. 
 In a different sense, and perhaps more importantly, storytelling and narration are 
ways of giving meaning to identity by consolidating its many elements and putting that 
identity in relation to other stories.  When we tell a story, we pick and choose what 
events syncopate that story, and we choose the way in which these disparate elements 
relate to one another.  When the taxicab drivers narrated their stories to us, they 
necessarily chose the elements of their experience that they thought could be arranged 
together to tell us the meaning of their story.  Certain details were useful, while some 
were ancillary.  How much they were paid became part of the story, while their favorite 
breakfast foods were decidedly unrelated.  By arranging a particular constellation of 
events and details, and through their own storytelling dynamics like narrative framing, 
they sought to give a certain unity to their otherwise dispersed lived experiences, and 
                                                
152 Bartlett's 1991 article "Feminist Legal Methods" articulates three principle feminist legal strategies: 
feminist practical reasoning, asking the "women" question and the question of the excluded, and 
consciousness-raising.  
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with that act rendered meaning to their story.  Because their particular stories were 
about their identities (or identity claims), these stories were stories meant to give 
meaning to their identity.  I will explore the relationship between storytelling, identity, 
meaning, and responsibility by way of literary digression; it will be the use of stories and 
literature that reflects back to us how we have come to understanding the complex 
implications of narration. 
 
In the (First) Case of Lily Briscoe, in the (Second) Case of Gerty MacDowell 
 Consider Lily Briscoe's contemplations to herself, "What does it mean, then, 
what does it all mean?" when Mrs. Ramsay passes away in Virginia Woolf's To the 
Lighthouse.153  The entire book, up until the last chapter, revolves around the Ramsay 
family and their preparations to go to the nearby lighthouse.  Mrs. Ramsay, the principle 
caretaker of the home, remains throughout these chapters a central character, even as 
the narrative voice shifts between various peoples.  However, in the final chapter, 
readers discover that in the intermittent time interval between the final chapter and the 
rest of the book, Mrs. Ramsay has died.  The final pages of the book are spent 
reminiscing about the effect of Mrs. Ramsay's life on each of the characters—how she 
both directly and indirectly influenced their maturation, their growth, and their 
individualities.  They nostalgically reflect and tell stories about Mrs. Ramsay's life in a 
way that is unique to the final chapter.  The effect is something like traveling in a car, for 
during the entire book, one is caught in the movement of Mrs. Ramsay's flittering around 
the house and town as she goes about her affairs.  Her actions and movements are 
                                                
153 Woolf 1989, 145 
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blurred and unfocused, like looking out the side of a car.  In this final chapter, as the 
characters reflect on her absence, the effect is of turning to look out the back of the 
car—as things move away, as one reflects upon things moving away from this very 
moment and looks back, things come into focus, gain context, gain a moment of clarity.  
Only by listening to the family members' reflective stories do we gain the perspective 
and framework with which to give meaning to Mrs. Ramsay's day-to-day affairs.  It is 
during the final chapter that we realize the contours of Mrs. Ramsay's character had 
hitherto been largely unintelligible because we, too, were caught in the present, the 
here-and-now.  For Lily Briscoe, the answer to "What does it mean, then, what does it 
all mean?" is that, in a higher register, we can now inquire about the meaning of Mrs. 
Ramsay's life and death in the first place—something not possible when we were in the 
here-and-now of the lived experience of the Mrs. Ramsay. 
Whatever story might result from the life of Mrs. Ramsay could only be framed 
and given meaning upon reflection, upon recalling select and particular events of her life 
and coordinating them into a story.  In a sense, the taxicab drivers must do the same: 
they must look into their histories, select and weave together elements to create a story 
that has necessarily passed (already-lived).  Storytelling cannot quite capture this 
moment, the moment of the stories' narration.  This temporal dimension of storytelling, 
its constant yielding to the past, its inability to capture the very moment of its invocation, 
has a two-fold significance.   
The first is that storytelling is necessarily reflective, a kind of personal reading of 
history.  It is necessarily idiosyncratic and incomplete, and despite this (indeed, because 
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of this), a story can generate meaning.  Importantly for identity politics, whose story is 
told in a given identity collective is a highly political act.  As several cultural and political 
theorists have signaled, oftentimes the story promulgated by an identity collective is a 
story that, by its very narration, leaves an absence that largely falls along gendered, 
nationalist, racist, and socio-economic vectors.154 The same point is poignantly made by 
Joyce in Ulysses when he begins shifting writing style between each of the chapters.  
Made especially clear in the chapter written from the perspective of the feminine Gerty 
MacDowell, Joyce shows that each style of storytelling both reveals certain dimensions 
of experience while suppressing others; that is, for each thing revealed in a story, 
something else his hidden away as absence.155  Gerty MacDowell speaks in what Joyce 
has (arguably) believed to be a "feminine" voice.  Her chapter speaks to transient 
fashion advertisements, obsessed self-critical examination of appearances, hyperbolic 
romanticized imagery, and flowery diction.  This "feminine" language paints the beach 
scene in a glossy light, and not until the perspective returns to Leopold Bloom do we 
see the beach as mundane.  The same beach described by two different narrative 
styles, with each revealing and suppressing different qualities of the scene—this nature 
of storytelling has profound implications for identity politics.  If the taxicab drivers seek to 
form one story for the collective (the story that went into the pamphlet), then we should 
ask whose voice was left out of the story.  Storytelling both is meaning-generative as 
well as an act of homogenization in late-modern identity politics – it has the capacity to 
be a double-edged sword, to be sure. 
                                                
154 See Narayan 1997, Song 2005, and Enloe 2004. 
155 Joyce 1990, 346-382 
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The second significance is that the subject of the story—whether the taxicab 
drivers or Mrs. Ramsay—can never be fully contained or captured by the story.  
Because the story must be assembled as a bouquet of selected details, and posited 
together into a univocal fiction, its subject will always be incomplete.  We can never 
know the taxicab drivers or Mrs. Ramsay in the fullest sense.  Indeed, we might suggest 
that "knowing" some experience or object fully is a metaphysical impossibility if that 
experience or object happens to be neither, but rather a speaking subject, my 
interlocutor to whom I respond with my story.  This will be one way of understanding the 
dimension of infinity in Levinas's account of the Other, as well as his account of 
transcendence.  For now, we can formulate the temporality of storytelling thus:  meaning 
erupts from a story precisely because the story is finite, where that story requires effort 
and work to be made into a cogent narrative that is idiosyncratically unified, and often at 
the expense of internal difference. 
We exercise our imaginative and creative capacities to craft a story that will 
generate meaning that is really a Gestalten product, for the meaning of the story indeed 
exceeds the sum of its parts.  The meaning of a story depends on how we arrange its 
smaller elements together, the relationships that we draw between those narrative 
elements, and importantly, to whom it is told.  That is, part of the meaning of a story is 
tied in to whom is in the audience.  The taxicab story was arranged with the audience 
already in mind: the Nashville community.  Its particular exposition, its narrative 
development, climax, and denouement were all crafted and oriented in relation to the 
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listener.  The meaning of their story of exploitation would have been largely lost and 
rendered pointless were the listener not already part of the equation. 
This is all done in tandem between a subject and an Other, between the story's 
Hero and its Bard.  We might say that without the Bard's story, there is no Hero at all.  
Without James Joyce, there is (in both literal and metaphorical modes) no Leopold 
Bloom, without Virginia Woolf no Mrs. Ramsay.  In the same vein, there is no speaker 
and storytelling Woolf or Joyce without Mrs. Ramsay and Leopold Bloom.  There are no 
students-helping-taxicab drivers without the drivers, and there are no exploited drivers 
without the students who tell their story.  The Hero and the Bard are not independent 
and autonomous subjects—they are constitutive of one another, and the practice that 
binds them in mutual interdependence is narration and storytelling. 
Storytelling, then, is also a relational project, told unto a unique Other.  
Storytelling puts that identity in society with others.  This is what allows Adriana 
Cavarero to argue that "between identity and narration…there is a tenacious relation of 
desire."156  Meaning does not unintentionally spring from storytelling.  Rather, we desire 
it.  We tell stories because we want meaning generated; we want our identity's story to 
be given cogency, perspective, and context; and we do this by telling these stories to 
others.  Here, even the constraints of language makes it difficult to speak of storytelling 
as meaning-generative, because in a sense, the only thing I can want is meaning.  My 
being in society has no compass, no direction without some strong form of meaning157; 
                                                
156 Caverero 200, 32 
157 Heidegger's fundamental insight that Dasein was not pre-World, but already in the World, and that this 
quality establishes Dasein as being full of World (whereas animals are poor-of-World), is pertinent here. 
See Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.   It seems pointless to talk of being in the world without 
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instead, it remains anomalous, apolitical, and wildly arbitrary.   This social disorientation 
is exacerbated in late modernity because of the proliferation of what Connolly calls 
"increased global contingency," the recognition that much of our personal desires, 
habits, characters, and values are not transcendental truths but contingent incidents.158  
Wendy Brown writes that "In the absence of orienting instruments, to avert 'existential 
bewilderment' inhabitants of postmodernity…resort to fierce assertions of 'identities' in 
order to know/invent who, where, and what they are."159 In a real political sense, we 
want to be in society with others, because only then can we tell and create stories for 
others that generate meaningful identities.  Otherwise, the concept of identity itself 
seems to unravel.   
 If we begin to critically engage Caverero's account of the subject who wants the 
story told to her by an Other, and of Levinas's subject who is provoked to respond to the 
Other, we produce a specific tension that can be framed in the following way: in 
Levinas, the stage is set so that the relationship between moi and the Other is one of 
height, one of asymmetry.  The Other is the origin to which all things orient themselves, 
including World.  However, in Caverero's concept of subjects being constitutively 
exposed, the relationship between self and other is more lateral.  Hero and Bard are 
both intertwined160, whereas in Levinas's story, I am intertwined with/by the Other and 
yet the Other is independent of myself.  I argue this is a productive tension between the 
                                                                                                                                                       
already being thrown into the world, thrown into desiring meaning from World.  Meaning, for us, isn't 
something secondary or incidental to being-in-world, but rather its constitutive dimension.  We are in the 
world to the extent that we desire meaning from it.  Thus, we are always caught in this act of engaging 
with it.   
158 Connolly 2002, 24 
159 Brown 1995, 35 
160 Cavarero 2000, the chapter of "The Necessary Other," especially 81-85. 
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two accounts, as such a tension points us towards a theoretical wedge that is 
specifically political.  The tension is a supplement of the kind that only emerges when 
we move between the ethical and political (and the literary), which will become clearer 
as we move forward. 
 
In the Case of Rei Ayanami 
The constitutive interrelation between bard and hero is beautifully depicted in 
Hideaki Anno's Neon Genesis Evangelion (NGE).  A series that acknowledges the 
importance of hybrid and fragmented identities, NGE helps us clarify the necessary 
distance-from-oneself (the distance between hero and bard) that is necessary for 
identity's meaning to emerge.  Both Cavarero and Levinas, at least superficially, share 
this understanding of distance-from-oneself.  Until now, I have portrayed storytelling and 
the consolidation of identity to occur between two physical bodies, two materially 
separate entities.  However, storytelling and identity do not presuppose stable and 
unified egos.  Just as the "We" in identity politics is never a univocal and homogeneous 
subject, neither is the "individual," conventionally understood. NGE offers fruitful artwork 
that ties together the dispersed and unstable constitution of the Ego, the role of 
narrative voice, and the effort of storytelling to consolidate and organize these parts.  
The epigraph to this chapter belongs to this piece of art. 
A twenty-six episode animation series, NGE recounts a science fiction story of a 
secret international organization (SEELE) seeking to force the next stage of humanity's 
evolution by manipulating the main characters Shinji Ikari, Rei Ayanami, and Asuka 
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Sohryu, a fictional UN organization called NERV, and a host of other fictional figures 
culled from the Christian bible and Jewish mysticism.  SEELE's goal is to initiate the 
next stage of human evolution by forcefully collapsing every single human's Ego barrier 
so that the entirety of humanity ascends to a unified World Consciousness (this is called 
Instrumentality).  The name of the final stretch of the series is appropriately named 
"Death and Rebirth."  Hegel and Lacan's influence in the animated series is easy to 
notice, as well as the existential overtones (exemplified in the episode "From Sickness 
Unto Death, And….", a clear reference to Kierkegaard's own text).  In the final moments 
of the series, the character of Rei Ayanami appears in a large body of red water, her 
lower half submerged.  A copy of her figure hovers in front of this first form, levitating 
above the water.  In addition, there are multiple other homunculi that take the form of 
her friends populating the space.  This is the interiority of Rei Ayanami's mind, and her 
conversation is between herself-as-other and herself-as-other.  There is, in fact, no 
objective "Rei Ayanami" vantage point.  At this juncture, Rei Ayanami has no identity in 
any strong sense, for the eschatology of the plot has already been put into motion.  As 
ego-barriers begin dissolving, characters' minds begin dissolving into pure being, 
completely undifferentiated from other minds/bodies.161  This movement is depicted as 
everyone dissolving into red primordial fluid, forming oceans of dissolving bodies. 
Rei Ayanami thus imagines herself in dialogue with various forms of herself, and 
they begin to recount stories.  They recount the way in which Rei has formed human 
bonds with others, and how those bonds allow her to be more than just a being.  Those 
                                                
161 NGE goes to great lengths to disrupt the Cartesian dualism of mind/body; when I describe the melting 
together of minds/bodies, I literally mean the melding of individuals on a unified body/mind dimension. 
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bonds differentiated her, singling her out from being in general.  As the conversation 
continues, one version of Rei refuses to forfeit her own individuated existence, 
concluding that she is more than "I am I" because of her unique bonds with others.  
Once the conversation ends, we do not see Rei's character until the finale—it appears 
that her ego, too, has been consolidated through storytelling; she has successfully held 
onto her ego-barrier along with the other characters.  By having stories about herself 
told to herself, she forces a unity upon her dispersed alter egos and recounts a unique, 
meaningful story of Rei Ayanami.162 
Cavarero, mistakenly on my reading, considers this narration to oneself the act of 
madmen, writing "only madmen tell themselves their own stories out-loud, making of 
themselves their only listener."163  Rei Ayanami is neither mad nor insane.164  In spite of 
her "false" being, her self-narration to herself is only possible because she has formed 
bonds to others, who put her ego into question.  Rei's identity is not originally 
fragmented (in whatever sense of originality is appropriate here), but its fractured 
texture is the result of her forming human bonds over time, where the others in her life 
continually and persistently question and re-question her life-story.  There is no 
possibility of solipsism in storytelling, even to oneself, where "the other (if there is one) 
functions only as a spectator to be dazzled," because the act of storytelling betrays "the 
uniqueness that exposes itself" which "brings to the scene a fragile and unmasterable 
                                                
162 Neon Genesis Evangelion raises important questions about the role of fhe Mother in this whole 
process, as well as the issue of intercorporality.  Literature that adds context to my own reading of the 
ending of NGE can be found in Mariana Ortega's My Father, He Killed Me; My Mother, She Ate Me: Self, 
Desire, Engendering, and the Mother in Neon Genesis Evangelion, as well as Susan Napier's When the 
Machines Stop. 
163 Caverero 2000, 85 
164 Here, we will go ahead and foreground all of the issues with claiming "madness" in any sense, 
especially in light of Foucault's genealogy of insanity. 
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self."165  The "Other" who questions Rei is both other characters as well as the viewer.  
This series is a story, after all.  We would not be able to relate to the story and to the 
characters if we, too, were not interacting with the story in such a way as to split open 
the cogency of egoism on both the level of the hero and the bard. 
Rei Ayanami's self-narration can be understood as an interiorization of a kind of 
politics of identity.  It is a politics for the simple but important fact that the discussion 
between the Rei alter egos is one of compromise and deliberation.  It is a politics of 
identity because what is at stake is the question of "who are you?"  The danger of 
Instrumentality lies precisely in its aim to exploit the necessarily unstable identity that 
characters like Rei (which is to say everyone, incidentally) express.  To overcome the 
dissolution of Self and the boundaries between Self and Other, Rei Ayanami's act of 
self-storytelling teaches us two important things:  that she has othered herself in 
response to other others166, and that the success of her character's identity in the finale 
testifies to the possibility of identity politics (albeit interiorized) reaching across 
difference and forming communities of difference.  When Rei Ayanami says "I am I," she 
means for "I" to include all of the shadows and half-visions of self-difference included. 
The autobiographical practices of Rei Ayanami reveal to us the "uniqueness of an 
identity which, only in relation, is bios instead of zoe."167  We will have to disagree, then, 
with one of Rei's alter ego's claim that she is nothing but a material puppet; the very 
                                                
165 Cavarero 2000, 84 
166 By other others, I mean her not her alter-egos as others, but the other characters—those with whom 
she has been in society. 
167 Cavarero 2000, 85; the difference between bios and zoe is first investigated by Aristotle, but its 
development, as a distinction, is given greater substance with Hannah Arendt's treatment.  Bios is the life 
story, the life lived with meaning—think biography—whereas zoe is mere life.  This is the distinction which 
foregrounds Giorgio Agamben's own analysis of bare life, not coincidentally. 
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capacity of that alter-ego to speak to another alter-Rei illuminates the trace of her 
unique and singular life story (while simultaneously a finite and idiosyncratic one) that is 
itself the provocation of other others (her peers like Shinji Ikari). 
 
In the Case of Shinji Ikari 
 Shinji:  A boy who has been (as typical of characters in this genre to which NGE 
belongs) assigned responsibility unwillingly—that of ultimately preventing the 
Instrumentality of all egos, the dissolution of "Self" and "Other."  He is a character who 
centralizes Schopenhauer's "hedgehog dilemma" within the series.  In the first few 
episodes, a character named Ritsuko discusses with Shinji's mother-surrogate (Misato) 
about the hedgehog dilemma, describing it as the phenomena where one wishes to 
become close to others, but as one becomes close to others, we prick ourselves and 
wish to retreat, to isolate, to shore up the walls of our identity (I am consciously moving 
back and forth between Levinas's dwelling and my account of storytelling).  The 
Hedgehog Dilemma, which traces itself throughout NGE in the lonely figure of Shinji, 
represents the crux of the entire drama because SEELE wishes to absolve the ego-
barriers of each "Self" so that the distance between "Self" and "Other" is closed, 
foregoing the possibility of emotional pain.  The manifestation of Hegel's "World Spirit" 
takes the form here, then, of a subject's final salvation from a life of emotional suffering.   
 NGE is offering an alternative to the call of the Other as salvation from pain and 
the possibility of meaning.  While Levinas argues that it is our helpless plea in the 
moment of torture that is the half-opening to the Other whose alterity provides the only 
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possibility of meaning and aid, for Hideaki Anno, it is psychological solipsism which 
might rescue the Self from the pain of being.  Schopenhauer's hedgehog dilemma can 
be understood as an antithetical statement to Levinas—the Other is not ethical 
salvation, but the source of all pain and suffering. 
The case of Shinji Ikari, in fact, reveals traces of both the Levinasian and the 
Schopenhauer stories.  These two stories are the two options presented to Shinji in the 
final moment of Instrumentality, and it is a very real question in identity politics:  do I 
open myself to others, or do I shut them out?  Which will offer me a way out of myself 
and into the realm of meaning?  Meaning here is understood as bios, and not mere zoe.  
Hovering in the sky, faced with the absolute blank whiteness of Shinji's interiority, the 
final minutes of NGE unfold based on the decision that Shinji chooses. 
"I was the beast that shouted 'I' at the heart of the world."  This is the subtitle for 
the final fifteen minutes of the series.  Such a name is appropriate, on my reading, 
because Shinji chooses in the final moments to reject Instrumentality.  He chooses to 
preserve Self/Other relations and to embrace the hedgehog dilemma for all of its woes.  
His choice shatters (literally) the empty white space that occupied the interiority of his 
mind and, instantaneously, his interiority is filled with the presence of others.  The now-
famous final fifteen seconds of the animated series depicts Shinji, standing in the center 
of the sky, surrounded by characters from the story, all clapping and saying one after 
another, "Congratulations Shinji!"  Rei Ayanami is among the crowd.  The final second 
of the series flashes words on the screen in white font with a black background, saying 
"Congratulations to all of the Children!" 
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"I was the beast that shouted "I" at the heart of the world."  In the moment of 
choice, in a moment of absolute freedom, Shinji chooses to forego his arbitrary and 
radical freedom and to challenge himself to be with others.  He foregoes being-in-
general and chooses to invest that very freedom in the finitude of being with others.  
There is, in the final episode, a beautiful scene where Shinji's obscured body floats in 
the white space, and as he converses with other beings about the possibility of 
meaning, he draws a floor within the space in which he floats.  All of a sudden, Shinji 
stands on this floor.  A disembodied narrator speaks to him: "now you can walk on the 
ground, although you have less freedom."  In the final moment, when Shinji rejects 
Instrumentality, when he shouts "I" at the heart of the World, he forcefully reconstitutes 
the various dissolved Egos of the world because for Shinji to shout "I" meaningfully he 
already presupposes and re-asserts the being of Others.  To shout "I" within the story of 
Shinji is to affirm singularity, but to affirm singularity is also to affirm sociality with others.  
In the end, then, even Hideaki Anno's NGE arrives to the conclusion that Levinas does: 
the possibility of living a bios as opposed to zoe, and the possibility of meaning for 
identity, is not found in solipsism, but is located in my moving from totalizing egoism to 
being with and for others.  Put another way, the pain of being with others is what offers 
the original condition for meaning generation. 
A final note on The End of Evangelion  that will gain significance in the final 
chapter of this argument:  as egos repopulate the world, the lone person with whom 
Shinji sees in the eschatological aftermath is Asuka Soryhu.  While the animated series 
ends on the scene of the crowd, the film, which provides the capstone conclusion to the 
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tale, has Shinji alone with Asuka in a sea of Christian crosses, surrounded by the wake 
of the destruction caused by the Hegelian eschatology.  Asuka is the person whose 
personality most opposes Shinji; unlike Shinji's introvert personality, Asuka is confident, 
forward, and in many cases the most emotionally volatile of the characters.  It should 
seem obvious now why she is the only person present in the world besides Shinji; if 
Shinji is to reject instrumentality and to choose to maintain the possibility of Self/Other 
relations in the world, then the final character to be at his side is the person who makes 
the pain of being-with-others most apparent, and most meaningful.  Asuka's opposition 
to Shinji testifies to the necessary tension and difference that makes ethics possible 
within community.  To make the first and fundamental ethical decision—to be in 
armistice with others, to be in community with them despite the pain of being-with-
others—is to be for others despite difference.  NGE, then, hints at a new sense of 
community "to come," the possibility of choosing to be for others in spite of (indeed 
because of) difference.  Congratulations to the children, indeed.  
 
The Hero and the Bard 
 These literary digressions teach us a few things about storytelling and 
responsibility.   
• Distance-from-oneself, the space between myself and the Other, is the 
theoretical core of storytelling that lies at the threshold of meaning's 
emergence for identity.  Narrating to others thus appears to represent a 
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constitutive project of ego-formation if we tether ego-formation to our 
desire for meaning in society.   
• The relationship between identity and storytelling is such that with each 
encounter by an Other, we must respond.  No matter how we respond, the 
successive responses we are constantly forced to offer result in a story, 
and it is our unique quality of being singled-out each time for response that 
lets the resulting story be our unique story.  A subject's story thus affirms 
our singularity while also betraying our constant exposure to others, from 
which that story emerges.  This notion is driven home in the unique 
"human bonds" Rei Ayanami establishes in her own autobiographical 
efforts. 
• Meaning for identity cannot be extricated from a sense of community, even 
as the specific articulation of that community mediates what kind of 
meaningful identities are possible.   
To return to the tension between Levinas and Cavarero, we now understand this tension 
to be a symptom of the fact that the opening of ethics, the assignment of responsibility 
in Levinas, has a story too.  It is a political story.  The difference between Cavarero and 
Levinas is not a difference arising because they offer conflicting stories on identity 
formation.  Instead, it indicates that identity's formation is more complicated than what 
either of their independent stories suggest.  The opening of ethics in our affection by an 
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Other is part of an on-going project of resulting168 a story.  Our telling stories, and our 
hearing stories told back to us—the intertwinement of the Hero and the Bard for 
Cavarero—indicates to us that the ethical moment in Levinas is a political moment.  The 
assignment of responsibility is also the opening of a story that betrays our very need for 
communities. 
  I explore storytelling here because in order to talk about responsibility in identity 
politics, we do not have the luxury of obsessing over the moment of encounter between 
the Self and the Other in Levinas (as useful as it has been to show the opening of ethics 
and responsibility).  There is a political story for that moment of encounter.  When 
someone encounters the taxicab drivers, and they offer their stories, we have the 
opening of ethics and of meaning, but the content of the meaning is constrained by the 
formal structures of storytelling, where these constraining structures are themselves the 
product of regimes of power.  As Lily Briscoe's example signals, storytelling even as 
response to the Other is retrospective; it is hindsight, even while it is the commitment to 
armistice, a commitment to responsibility.  Even while identity's justification in identity 
politics is ethical response, it is not immune to attenuation by social norms, historical 
delimitations, and regulatory regimes of intelligibility.  Although exploring the why of 
storytelling has let us uncover the ethical possibilities in identity politics, the how of 
storytelling remains in play.  Thus why the final chapter addresses the notion of 
community, for it is in a new articulation of community that the how and why of 
storytelling (and by extension, responsibility) become themselves intertwined. 
                                                
168 I use "resulting" as the verb here consciously.  To use "producing" would indicate that the story's 
emergence is an act of agency, rather than something that happens because of our unchosen and elicited 
responses which precede agency.  
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One contention should be addressed here.  If identity assumes itself into identity 
politics as the identity claim "We/You are, who is the speaker of the claim?  Or, more 
specifically, to whom or what does the "We" refer?  Initially, we might think, at first, that 
late modern identity politics is waged with these We are/You are claims, and the 
antecedent for these speakers (We) are stories about identities.  In the background of 
these "We are…" claims are narratives about each identity.  
 The relationship between the identity claim and storytelling is slippery, both 
politically and grammatically.  If identity is contemporaneously understood as the "We 
are…" claim, the "We" does not appear to be an ambiguous pronoun with no proper 
antecedent if identities have been given meaning from stories.  The obvious question 
seems to be:  what ambiguity resides in late-modern "identity" if it has a story?  Put 
another way, how do we understand this articulation of identity to be little more than its 
identity claim if it already had a story? 
 To answer this question, understanding how storytelling and the identity claim are 
different semiotic technologies of the self is necessary.  The identity claim is our political 
act of deploying our identity as a univocal claim.  It is the act that posits the sovereign 
"We" while also setting the terms for how "You" can be described. We tell stories in 
order to consolidate the fragmented community that must maintain a pretense of unity to 
make the "We are…" claim.  Stories, however, do not provide the pre-political identity 
with which claims utilize for grounding.  Stories cannot reflect some sort of "essence" to 
an identity, because no story is ever quite the same—even a written story.  Anyone who 
tries to tell a story orally knows that in each recitation, the story comes out slightly 
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differently.  Even when reading the same written story, the reader draws out different 
dimensions and nuances.169  Each recitation is more than just a patient description of 
some kind of essence, or an immutable fact about an event or person.  Rather, it is a 
willful and forced idiosyncratic interpretation of its topic, an effort to create meaning from 
finititude in the here-and-now with the Other who is here-and-now, demanding my story.  
Stories in late-modern identity politics are offered as forced and willful attempts to 
generate meaning for identity in defense of the identity claim.  It is a response to "Who 
are you?  What is your identity, which you possess in order to make this claim against 
us?"  Each time the identity claim is dispensed, an Other calls upon its speaker for 
justification, and often this justification is a story about that identity.  It is a story that is 
crafted and tailored for the moment, arranged so that the meaning generated suits how 
the speaker wishes to relate to the audience.  It is a response to the Other, who 
demands the subject to justify her claim of identity, and her response (in Levinas's 
language) will be me voici, or "here I am."170 The taxicab drivers narrated their stories to 
us to generate meaning for that identity, because implicit in their desire in asking us for 
help was the hidden yet understood knowledge that justification for who they were, must 
necessarily be demanded.  As Judith Butler writes, the subject has been demanded by 
an Other to give an account of her or himself.171 
                                                
169 This is also how we might defend the act or practice of storytelling from always being an essentialist 
project.  Although the content of the story might reflect essentialist attitudes, the act of storytelling itself 
always fails to reflect some dehistoricized essence for identity because each act of storytelling is itself 
idiosyncratic, unique, and singular.  Thus, as a practice, it cannot claim to describe an identity's essence, 
for it would negate itself, cross itself in the very narration of that essence. 
170 Me Voici, or "here I am," is the specific formulation of the primary response to the call of the Other in 
Levinas.  Here, I am borrowing its semantic quality as a response rooted in the here-and-now, but will 
offer considerable elaboration in the following chapter. 
171 Judith Butler 2005, 19-23 
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 Meaning from our stories, then, are also constitutively generated as responses to 
the Other, to her demands for justification for the consolidation of my identity, and in a 
sense, this is why Cavarero insists on calling subjects as "constitutively exposed," as I 
have been doing.  To be a subject with a story is to be exposed to an Other, to 
recognize that "we perceive ourselves and others as unique beings whose identity is 
narratable in a life-story," and to recognize that the inaugurating disclosure of our 
identity depends on being opened-up and exposed to the Other.172  Pushing past 
Levinas, then, we see that storytelling is ethical response even whilst that response 
itself is situated in a greater story; this is now more than a trace of the "They" in the 
"We."  This is a trace of "You" in each "I."  This is the ethical intertwinement of Hero and 
Bard in the act of narration. 
 We see in Levinas's concept of the dwelling that there are two modes of 
otherness at play in the formation of identity: the figure of the Stranger and the 
Feminine.  The act of storytelling in identity politics is in fact an ethical interplay between 
the subject, the Stranger, and the Feminine.  We tell a story that both harbors the 
subjects within the dwelling, within itself, even while it is told to others, and it is only 
through this complex interaction on multiple levels that makes the story both ethical 
response (as responding to others who demand me to justify myself) as  
well as a meaningful gesture.  The story (ethical response) is always told oriented 
towards someone outside of my dwelling/identity even as the very practice itself is 
enabled and conditioned by those who support me, who discipline me and shape my 
desire.  Those enabling figures support my very capacity for freedom that is always 
                                                
172 Cavarero 2000, 33 
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being put into question by Others.  Storytelling as ethical response illuminates how 
identity is constructed upon invisible Others (like the Feminine), so that the "We" in 
identity politics (like We students) cannot be constructed without the help of supporting 
subjects (like the Taxicab drivers), and at the same time this "We" has no meaning, has 
no orientation without being provoked to ethical response (storytelling) to the Stranger.  
The key to a new identity politics is to recognize that our responsibility extends to the 
taxicab drivers as well, and that they are as much the Stranger to us as they have been 
the exploited Feminine within our dwelling/identity. 
 To entirely invert the previous understanding of the taxicab driver movement, it is 
our identity as students that must be put into question by our encounter with drivers, to 
understand our complicit exploitation in their plight by our political apathy.  Here, it is in 
our mutual acts of storytelling which ethically intertwine "We" and "They" that lets 
difference here becomes the provocation to responsibility (by being the provocation for 
storytelling.)  They are the heroes of the story, and we become the bards to recount 
their stories to others and, our role as bards is one of responsibility.  By telling stories to 
us, they both recognize and reiterate the interdependence and constitutive relationality 
of hero and bard, author and reader, I and you. 
Storytelling is not always a violent homogenizing process.  To the extent that 
Rei's storytelling reiterated the fact that her identity had always been scored through 
with tension and difference, and at the same time affirmed her living singularity, we can 
buttress this point by returning to "Take Back the Night" events.  At these events, 
women recount stories to one another about cases of abuse.  Such a storytelling event 
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provides women context for their abuse, provides perspective that helps them cope with 
their own experiences while building coalition and community, bound together by their 
stories.  Yet, even while these stories bring them together into community under a 
shared experience of abuse, these stories also affirm the uniqueness of their lives.  
Each person tells their story not because they are all the same, but precisely because 
each of their stories is singularly unique.  Their stories reveal the complex relationship 
between race, glass, gender, age, socioeconomic class, neighborhood, and marital 
status, among other things, and how they all intersect in a unique story.  Importantly, 
these unique, singular stories, which underscore their unique differences, are also 
precisely what bring them into community with one another.  Rei Ayanami recounting 
stories to her various "selves" can be interpreted as an effort to consolidate her identity 
that is itself hybrid and fractured by bring them into community with one another, in 
order to understand who she is.  Participants of "Take Back the Night" also affirm their 
community through difference.  Just as Lily Briscoe is the bard for the hero Mrs. 
Ramsay, the women are each others' heroes and bards, Rei Ayanami is simultaneously 
hero and bard (by encountering and refracting others through herself), Shinji refuses to 
have only either hero or bard, and the university students and the taxicab drivers are 
each other's heroes and bards.  What is at stake in each of these examples of 
storytelling is the formation of identity that is mediated through a community scored 
through with difference, where difference serves as the necessary distance from which 
narration derives its capacity for meaning as well as the assignment of responsibility. 
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To recapitulate, narration offers several important insights for us about how we 
understand identity politics to be founded upon responsibility because the practice of 
storytelling lies at the nexus of the relationship between meaning, identity, community, 
and constitutive exposure between a subject and others.  Storytelling generates 
meaning for identities by putting that story in relation to others, so that the story gains 
the perspective and distance necessary for meaning to be formed.  Storytelling is also 
offered as justification before an Other who demands explanation for the identity claim, 
and importantly, if this story is told as a collective story, its necessarily finite structure 
necessitates that narrators mask (or produce) absences within its interiority, and these 
absences are often absences of marginalization and exclusion.  Storytelling, as a 
political practice however, retains the capacity to form new kinds of community that uses 
the very difference within the community to create meaning for identity while also 
affirming the singularities of its constituents.   
 
Why are the taxicab drivers not succeeding? 
 If storytelling is constitutive to subject formation and the inauguration of identity, 
and if such a practice is necessarily relational, it is a practice that affirms and reiterates 
the "We" as not sovereign and autonomous, but a "We" that is always already in 
society, dependent on others who enable and coordinate its emergence, structuring a 
complex field of relations between identity, otherness, responsibility, and the stories that 
interweave them together.  The practice of storytelling is the opening up of an identity, a 
dwelling, to the call of the Other, while also intertwining the speaker with her Feminine 
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others as well as Stranger others.  We are now in a position to posit that storytelling is 
not only constitutive to my own subject formation, but it is a fundamentally ethical 
gesture towards the Other who is here before me, demanding my justification for my 
freedom (of identity).  Storytelling betrays my assignment "to be a Self" while also 
situating that assignment within the history that adds context to that assignment.  
Meaning-generation in identity politics is bound up in this complex ethical interaction 
towards Others, other Others, the Feminine and the Stranger. 
Why, then, do the taxicab drivers encounter such resistance in late-modern 
identity politics if they are using storytelling and narration as political tactics? 
 The taxicab drivers have had little success in pressing for increased economic 
security, in the form of benefits, higher wages, or even social support; local government 
administrators cite the lack of any explicit responsibility for the taxicab drivers.  While 
admitting that the drivers were certainly experiencing "hard times," to argue that they 
were "exploited" was to suggest that someone had intervened in the free market to 
deflate the "natural" wages that they were earning.  But, due to the leading 
Representative Jim Cooper's strong commitment to free market principles, not much 
evidence of market interference existed.  Thus, the drivers were not "exploited," but 
rather served as the necessary and important losers in the greater game of free market 
fundamentalism.173  No obligation or responsibility existed to help the drivers. 
 This is the failure of an identity politics based on claims of identity that function as 
claims of entitlement, of right, and of injury.  It is a politics with an ethical vacuum, filled 
                                                
173 Free market fundamentalism is a term deployed in the work of William Finnegan, Jeff Faux, Joseph 
Stiglitz. 
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instead with ideologically-derived game rules that declare that the only notion of 
responsibility needed in politics is the responsibility to make sure no one changes the 
rules of the game.174  It is a rigged game where claims of identity are only heard if they 
conform to the hegemonic discourse, if they conform and reinforce the dominant values 
of the politics instead of putting those very values into question.  The identity claim that 
succeeds is the identity claim that does not open up into dialogue.  This is the "gender-
neutral" housing initiative succeeding only upon conforming to the already-accepted 
"LGBTQI" identity politics; it was a political victory that reinforced the university's 
commitment to diversity without seriously putting into question the rampant 
heterosexism that created the discriminatory housing policy in the first place. 
 Narration is not a practice limited to identity politics.  Just as the ubiquity of 
universal discourses and concepts point us toward the necessary persistence of 
identity, identity's persistence in turn points us towards storytelling's similar status.  
However, despite how the theoretical implications of narration rupture the contemporary 
articulation of identity politics, it does not yet produce a new kind of politics.  That 
identity politics contains storytelling does not ontologically necessitate an instantiation of 
political rules of mutual interdependence and responsibility.  Recognizing that the 
taxicab drivers are using storytelling does not abstractly force our politics to also 
manifest the role of responsibility in redressing their plight; the reality of their slow 
progress only makes this point apparent. 
   At this juncture, it might seem as if I am unfairly blaming the taxicab drivers for 
using storytelling and the identity claim "We are" because, in a way, they are complicit in 
                                                
174 Paul Krugman offers an analysis of these "rules" in The Return of Depression Economics. 
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late-modern identity politics because they are coalescing around an injury and seek 
entitlement.  After all, why shouldn't they use storytelling to build coalition and to use the 
tools of identity politics to better their lives marked by insecurity and exclusion?  If they 
cannot pressure the local government to force Allied Cab to increase their wages, then 
some form of identity politics is necessary to move the broader community to come to 
their side, it seems.  By critiquing their late-modern identity politics strategies, am I not 
undermining the fact that they are exploited, and are pursuing economic and social 
justice, and rightfully so? 
 To clarify, it is both how the taxicab drivers need to succeed and the fact that 
they are failing, that necessitates a rethinking of contemporary identity politics and the 
notion of political community it entails.  Storytelling is a double-edged weapon; it can 
homogenize community and it can affirm difference and singularity within a community.  
I am referring here to something like the difference between storytelling for the national 
platforms for the Democrats and Republicans, and the storytelling in "Take Back the 
Night" events.  One homogenizes, and the other discloses heterogeneity.  By 
understanding these polar affects of storytelling, we can cut cleanly into the plight of the 
taxicab drivers and seek to create an identity politics that cultivates a new type of 
political community that lets their storytelling affirm their difference and make that 
difference the source of our responsibility towards them.  That is, we want the effects of 
storytelling at "Take Back the Night" events.  If the problem is a kind of political apathy 
that prevents us from empathizing with the taxicab drivers across socio-economic, 
racial, and national lines, and this apathy is derived from late-modern identity politics, 
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then it is their continued exploitation that provokes us to change the rules of the game 
so that responsibility is part of the equation.  If the problem is that they are they and we 
are we, then the "they" and "we" need to be completely rethought as intimately and 
complexly intertwined, as the act of storytelling signals. 
 Instead of strictly deducing from the implications of storytelling's relation to 
identity an ethical dimension to identity politics, we should instead look to storytelling as 
a resource to articulate an alternative vision of identity politics—one that might live up to 
the ethical commitment bound up in the formation of identity itself.175  What we want is a 
viable political stance that lets us contest the form of the identity claim, so that the Hero 
and the Bard can relate to one another, form a community with one another, and all the 
while cutting through Connolly's ethical conundrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
175 Although "deducing" an ethical dimension from identity politics might appear to be my aims thus far, 
such a practice would be rather disingenuous to how we live politics.  Well-reasoned arguments or 
"deductions" from ontological facts about Being do not necessitate their own politics.  People do not 
always heed "the best argument," or the soundest position.  I am concerned with a concrete 
transformation of politics, and as such, I do not intend to frame my thesis as "the best argument" that will 
magically reshape our political sphere.  Such is why I have chosen to frame my thesis as articulating an 
"alternative vision" or position with which we can take hold of in politics, and use this new position to do 
politics itself—to engage with others with the hopes of seeking to transform our lived community.  It is not 
just a counter-move, but also a disturbance and reorienting of what I see as the dominant vision of how 
we should engage in identity politics. 
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V.  I Was the Beast That Shouted "I" at the Heart of the World 
 
-The true mark of the monster lies, rather, in Man… 'Man' is a universal that 
applies to everyone precisely because it applies to no one.  It disincarnates itself 
from the living singularity of each one, while claiming to substantiate it.  It is at 
once masculine and neuter, a hybrid creature generated by thought, a fantastic 
universal produced by the mind.  It is invisible and intangible, while nevertheless 
declaring itself to be the only thing 'sayable' in true discourse.  It lives on its 
noetic status, even though it never leaves behind any life-story, and impedes 
language with the many philosophic progeny of its abstract conception.176 
      Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives 
 
With a grand total of three pages in Totality and Infinity dedicated to "the Other 
and the Others,"177 we can say without exaggeration that Levinas's work is curiously 
averse to the question of politics.  After all, except for these three pages that address 
the not-insignificant problem of other Others (read: politics and community), almost the 
entirety of Levinas's ethical drama unfolds as a play with two characters.  However, 
despite his scant work on politics, his work still offers resources for us to try to engage 
the question of politics with new perspective and fresh insight.  Although I have already 
begun to do so, my explicit goal from this point forward is use Levinas's thought as a 
tool to cut through the ethical conundrum of late-modern identity politics.  The aim is to 
                                                
176 Cavarero 2000, 9 
177 Levinas 1969, 212-215 
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recuperate identity politics' ethical possibilities and to iterate a political ethics that might 
let us rearticulate how we can come to understand and congeal identity as multiplicity, 
as a community of singular subjects whose differences are not a source of protest 
against a universal community or universal theory of justice, but are the strength of a 
new identity politics. 
To talk of community might seem counter-productive since Levinas's own thought 
is really a philosophy of ethical singularity, and we might wonder whether the concept of 
an identity politics still rooted in community is itself at odds with something we might 
term a "politics of singularity."  By a politics of singularity, I denote the notion of a politics 
whose central theme is that individuals are not particular instances of a universal, but 
are individuals who count as such.  A politics of singularity can perhaps be understood 
as a politics that attempts to do away completely with essentialist discourses—that 
individuals are little more than dupes of essences, understood in terms of their 
relationship to the dehistoricized, disincarnated, and abstract universal.  We must be 
careful and not think that, put this way, a politics of singularity is a politics on the 
individual alone, and whose participation in a community already itself violates that 
individual's singularity.  Our temptation to oppose the two in this way only accrues 
currency if we remain within the rules and assumptions of late-modern identity politics, 
however.  Community must be understood as homogenous, univocal, essentialist, and 
resistant to reconfiguration for it to be opposed to the notion of singularity.   
What we miss by opposing community and singularity is that singularity only 
becomes possible in community, albeit not the community of late-modern identity 
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politics.  Singularity becomes possible because I have been singled out by an Other, 
and have been drawn into sociality in an ethical modality.  Singularity is not a radical 
individualism, but instead a radical emphasis on my being called out to respond to the 
ethical claims of others who live with me, together.  Importantly, this is not a community 
of sameness.  This is a community of ethical responsibility despite and through 
difference of race, sexuality, nationality, age, or anything at all.  It is a community that is 
established on the singularizing ethical relationship, where the meaning of our identity is 
generated in my being-for-the-Other, together, with difference in hand.  The aim is to 
foreclose the possibility of letting the group's identity label be disincarnated from the 
living singularities of each one of its constituents—what Cavarero admonishes the 
universal "Man" for doing in the epigraph of this chapter (although perhaps not carefully 
distinguishing between universalism and essentialism). 
Once we manage to hold essentialist discourses at bay (which, of course, takes 
constant renewed efforts), we can let the universal, which is so important for the 
establishment of identity, function as to suffocate neither singularity nor let singularity 
become so radical and misunderstood that it becomes an atomistic politics.  Instead, as 
Laclau and Balibar also argue, the goal is to let the relationship between the universal 
and the particular become a resource for the reiteration and multiplication of 
difference.178  Let us not forget difference, but to engage ethics despite difference.  It 
                                                
178 Etienne Balibar articulately argues, "The…desirable path would put communication in the service of 
the reproduction of differences, that is, it would affirm singularity by the mediation of the universal.  And, 
reciprocally, it would affirm the reality of the universal by the mediation of singularities."  This is, in my 
view, what Human Rights claims do, in contrast to identity claims.  This is not to preclude how human 
rights can function as identity claims, but to point out that properly articulated, Human Rights serve not to 
create a community of sameness, but rather to facilitate and mediate the creation of a global community 
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matters not to me whether the taxicab drivers are Afghani or Iranian, nor does it matter 
whether the war prisoner is an 'enemy combatant' or not, when it comes to my being 
responsible for them.  Difference will, of course, help us discriminate strategies of how 
to help this Other before me, but difference does not yet enter into the formula of 
whether I am responsible or not.  I do not read Levinas's ultimatum to not even "notice 
the color of their eyes"179 as a command to ignore difference, and (in a hypocritical way) 
treat everyone the same, but a command to bracket off the color of their eyes when 
being assigned responsibility.180  It is the ultimatum to be responsible to them not 
because of the color of their eyes, or because they are my family, or because they are 
poor, but to eschew the very word "because."  It is to realize that my being was always a 
being-ethically-for this Other.  It is living with and through community difference that 
ethical singularity (and hence a hospitable conception of identity) becomes possible. 
Ethical singularity, to return to the example of the dwelling, arises in my having 
committed myself to the opening up of my identity to the Other.  That is, singularity is 
only possible in a community that is lived as multiplicity, where those who are different 
from me (that is to say, everyone) can, without my anticipation, approach me and found 
my identity, which is inaugurated and transformed in the encounter itself.181  This is the 
gender-neutral housing project from my university that, literally, opened up our dwelling 
to transgendered student demands and, thus, concretely changed the constitution of our 
                                                                                                                                                       
scored through with difference.  See "Culture and Identity (Working Notes)" in The Identity in Question 
175.  
179 Levinas 1985, 85 
 
181 This kind of temporality is possible because of how we have come to understand the dwelling as 
establishing an incomplete sense of identity, where its full inauguration emerges from our being-for-the-
other in ethical response. 
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dorm's identity.  It was in each of our residents' ethical gesture towards one another and 
towards new residents that let us, now in the Levinasian sense, opened the possibility of 
a new meaningful identity not based on exclusion, but on a cosmopolitan sense of 
difference.  Our dorm's ethical identity becomes understood as living community already 
scored through with difference. 
A community whose identity emerges with the "We are…" claim is a community 
that maintains a pretense of an uncontestable commonality.  It hides its inherent internal 
differences with its storytelling.  When confronted with the demand for justification of the 
"We are…" claim, "We" tell an idiosyncratic story that masks difference.  Because only 
by selecting certain details of the community can a story generate meaning, and 
because the details chosen attempt to iterate how there is unified and sovereign "We", 
the community formed is one of commonness and sameness.  It is this conception of 
community that is capable of making the identity claim, and on a disturbing level, it is 
their story that renders everyone the same within that community.  This is why the threat 
of essentialism remains so pressing in late-modern identity politics. 
What is surprising when we interpret Levinas right alongside late-modern identity 
politics is that we find, deeply embedded in the politics' theoretical structure, that it 
always had the seeds for questions of ethics.  Even in late-modern identity politics, its 
obsession with identity is still an obsession with the Other, with my justifying myself 
before the Other.  The challenge that we are faced with, then, is whether we could 
articulate an identity politics that encourages us to commit ourselves to the ethical 
relationship assigned to us by our fellow beings who live with and alongside us.   
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The key to this question, which is the same key for cutting through Connolly's 
ethical conundrum, is the rearticulation of what we mean by community, as well as how 
we live it—of community that is not a monologue of the "We," but a community of 
difference where the "I" and "We" are not static and sovereign, but dynamic and 
responsive to others. 
So, to dismantle Connolly's ethical conundrum… How do we ethically 
discriminate between others without foisting upon them the very historical constructions 
which enact a kind of social and ethical violence?  That is, how do we understand ethics 
to be non-violent?  As our analysis of the identity claim, storytelling, and ethical 
singularity shows, the answer to addressing this conundrum lies in the invocation of the 
conundrum itself.  We now see that the problem of foisting historical constructions upon 
others is more than a "failure" of ethics.  Rather, our constant failure of ethics is 
precisely what makes our ethical responsibility infinite.  Connolly's ethical conundrum 
presupposes wanting to ethically relate to others in the first place, and such a 
presupposition already shows that the trace of the Other has passed by and has 
prompted me to respond.  To want to ethically discriminate between and for Others, I 
have already been inaugurated as a responsible "I."  For the conundrum, even for the 
moral skeptic, ethics has already been opened up, and it is our inevitable and persistent 
perpetration of social and ethical violence that makes our responsibility indefinite in 
nature.  What the ethical conundrum shows, then, is not an inevitable failure and thus 
closure of ethics.  Rather, it points us towards the never-ceasing ethical imperatives 
already presupposed in our politics of identity.  Even if questions of justice are now 
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revealed to be contestable and contingent, we have not lost the grounds for asking 
those very questions, and we have not lost the grounds for ethics.  Ethical inquiry, just 
like the practice of political critique, does not ever come to closure. 
Connolly's ethical conundrum does not appear to be a conundrum, per se, 
because the answer sought not only is how to have a non-violent ethics.  Rather, the 
answer lies in recognizing the already presupposed opening up of ethics by the trace of 
the Other by the very formulation of the conundrum, and our need to rearticulate 
community so that ethical singularity is possible. The community lets the "how" and 
"why" of ethics become intertwined within the act of storytelling, like two hands touching, 
two lips touching, where one opens out into the other, always touching the touch of the 
other, meaningfully and hospitably and necessarily different-yet-together.182 Connolly's 
conundrum thus unravels because this new "We" is a "We" that does not emerge from 
the identity claim "We are…" and "You are…" but a "We" made possible precisely from 
irreducible difference—of the singularity of the "I" and "You."  The monologue of the 
"We" has become a dialogue to and for others.   
 In terms of concrete steps, I am hesitant to offer prescriptive ethical demands in 
our politics, because I am attracted to and compelled by Levinas's normative force that 
is not fully prescriptive, but open-ended.  As Charles Mills teaches us, theory need not 
tell us where to go, but simply tell us that we need to go in the first place, and to admit 
that our theory's incompleteness is also a strength.183  However, I recognize that such a 
commitment to open-ended ethical politics might lead some critics to suggest that I have 
                                                
182 I am drawing this metaphor from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's chapter "The Chiasm" from The Visible and 
the Invisible. 
183 Mills 2005 
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too judiciously been, albeit implicitly, giving an account of procedural politics, rather than 
offering an identity politics with any substantive ethical content.  The thought here is that 
by focusing so much on the opening of ethical inquiry, and the various ways of living 
ethics, I have ceded too much ground for making justifiable normative content claims.  
To this, I admit that my "content" commitment might leave much to be desired by critics 
bent on having explicit, numerically listed normative ethical commitments that arise from 
my ethical rearticulation of identity politics.  I stand by this move, however, because we 
should have little fear in fostering such a dynamic politics.  Some critics might suggest 
that not to specify detailed and content-full normative criteria for an ethical politics is to 
necessarily cede to ethical and moral skepticism/relativism.  However, we need not 
approach this problem with such a dichotomous understanding of full normativity 
opposed to total relativity.  In between these two polarities is politics; hence why I call 
this a political ethics.  It is a call to persistent ethical inquiry, oriented by the universal 
concept of the ethical singularity bestowed by the Other, that conjoins itself with politics 
to negotiate issues of particularity, of this Other who is before me and faces me: 
The Other is the only being that one can be tempted to kill.  This temptation to 
murder and this impossibility of murder constitute the very vision of the face.  To 
see a face is to already hear "You shall not kill" and to hear "You shall not kill" is 
to hear "social justice" (emphasis added).184 
 Let us be clear on what precisely a Levinasian rearticulation of late-modern 
identity politics is doing.  I am recognizing that identity's formation is an ethical project of 
a subject that is constitutively responsive, affirming the primacy of others.  However, 
                                                
184 Levinas 1997, 8 
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because late-modern identity politics proliferates group differences with identity claims 
of "We are," claims of identity also hide difference within the group itself, enabling 
Connolly's ethical conundrum.  Breaking through this conundrum requires recuperating 
the ethical undercurrents of identity politics so that ethical inquiry and responsibility can 
serve as resources for identity consolidation. 
 Thus, in a sense, there is a normative content dimension to this account of 
identity politics, although this content does not represent prescriptive moral or ethical 
axioms.  Rather, the content dimension is this new sense of community necessary for 
ethical singularity and identities to be responsive to others.  Even while laying the 
question of ethics bare to politics, in order to enable political identity to be formed in light 
of ethical responsibility and inquiry, we have to get at this new sense of community that 
is not homogenous and univocal, but populated by small, finite, and different subjects 
whose very differences enable living ethical singularity.  The content dimension of this 
open ended political ethics is thus not conventional axioms of "how to live the good life," 
but a demand for a cosmopolitan democratic polity that makes investing freedom as 
ethical responsibility a viable avenue for identity formation.  "We" are now taking a 
stance towards democratic deliberation and contestation as fundamentally ethical in 
nature, and to let such a stance guide our identity and community formation.  In the 
same vein, this is a call to collective action.  In this articulation of identity politics, 
responsibility is not a question localized within just my immediate "private" sphere.  
Instead, responsibility necessitates that I join politics to fight for collective and 
community action and transformation.  It is not enough to welcome the Other into my 
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home; this new identity politics comes about when I join politics to fight for higher wages 
for taxicab drivers who have been excluded from enjoying economic and social security 
regardless and because of difference.  In this political milieu is where we approach 
articulating identity in a way different from late-modern identity politics. 
 We can get a thicker concept of responsibility that is more than just 
responsiveness at this juncture.  If Levinas can at least make clear the opening of 
ethical responsibility rooted in identity politics, than we can make the following 
argument:  in order for me to be able to live my identity meaningfully, and in order for my 
identity not to be crafted in essentialist discourses, but through and upon my own 
dynamic life, I need a community that enables ethical singularity.  This is because only 
through being individuated by the Other can I cultivate a meaningful identity, tell a story 
about my own dynamic and ongoing process of self-formation, and in a sense, express 
my own individual uniqueness.  Late-modern identity politics suffocates this possibility of 
meaning within my community, however.  My identity in contemporary identity politics is 
an identity that gains legitimacy only if it conforms to the "sameness" of the broader 
collective, and so my identity, in a sense, has no real meaning within this community, 
but only opposed and against others who are excluded.  Thus, if I want my identity to 
have meaning for myself, my friends, my colleagues, all of us counting as people who 
ethically count as such, and not just as members of a broader identity collective, I need 
a thicker sense of responsibility towards others, a responsibility to open and keep open 
a persistent critical ethical inquiry towards/for others.   
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In short, an identity politics that lets responsibility and ethical inquiry shape 
identity's formation lets that identity be formed as constitutively responsive to 
differences within the broader community, and thus, in a double-movement, also allow 
my identity to have meaning for myself.  My freedom of identity becomes meaningful 
within community, and not only to those outside of it, when community is lived as 
multiplicity, and to cultivate such a community requires responsibility. 
Now, it seems here that I might still be begging the question.  There is still no full 
normative grounding that demands that I take on more responsibility to foster this 
community; after all, this whole account of a new identity politics is simply an alternative 
vision, and presupposes a whole constellation of values, which I will simply label "social 
justice", in order to make it seem desirable.  But, I think to continue begging the 
question here is to miss, again, the point in a similar fashion to the moral skeptic: the 
begging of the question points towards how the moral cannot be fully (justifiably) 
normative.  There is also nothing wrong with this; having to use explicitly moral and 
ethical discourse, without full rationalization, to articulate responsibility only illuminates 
for us a real, concrete relationship between theory and practice.  The elusiveness of full 
normativity points us towards the importance of living theory, because so long as we 
cultivate a political practice of living community as ethical responsibility, we will continue 
to split open the question of theoretical justification.  By arguing that self-formation and 
identity politics has always been possessed by an ethical undercurrent, I am offering a 
conceptually precise political stance for living a kind of practical (and critical) politics.  
This is not to avoid the question of normative justification, but to recognize what Spivak 
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sees as "the contradiction [of] the necessary relationship between two discontinuous 
begged questions… proof that we are born free and proof that it is the other that calls us 
before will."185  The elusiveness of full normativity points us towards the indefinite and 
infinite nature of ethical response and critical reflection, a trace of the Other's perpetual 
questioning of my freedom.  Why do we be responsible?  Because the Other calls us to 
be so in our desire for meaning.  This answer is not deductively contiguous with the 
question, and it is not supposed to be.   
So, what does an identity claim look like now?  I suppose "claim" is no longer the 
only proper word choice, so we might say "identity question."  Let the identity expression 
be a question, and not always a claim, so that identity does not reiterate and reinforce 
an essentialist "We," but be an invitation to dialogue, with people opening up their 
dwellings to one another and willing to listen to their neighbors needs and demands.  
This, of course, has not undermined the role of rights discourse in identity politics; as 
Nedelsky has argued herself, rights discourse, once made clearly relational, becomes a 
discourse of responsibility, and not always of entitlement.186  Rights then operate in 
service of cultivating ethical singularity, instead of excusing oneself from investing 
freedom into that very ethical singularity. 
I can at the least postulate about how we might reconfigure our understanding of 
political community to capture this crucial political-ethical dimension illuminated by co-
reading Levinas with late-modern identity politics.  One possibility is an enshrinement of 
constitutional responsibilities; think of the Canadian Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, in 
                                                
185 Spivak 2005, 146 
186 Nedelsky 2008 
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contrast to the U.S. Bill of Rights.  Such a move might help us cultivate political 
community based on our ethical relationships with others, and serves as an institutional 
way of creating new social norms that are less about entitlement and more about 
responsibility towards others. 
Small things like renaming employment "benefits" to employer "responsibilities," 
or some variation of this kind, would also represent a subtle but important change in the 
way that we think of the relationship between employer and employed (maybe a little 
less exploitation and master/slave dynamic and a little more community of ethical 
singularity). 
 The most important change, by far, that is demanded by a new ethical identity 
politics, however, is actually methodological.  In our politics of identity, we need simply 
to hold at bay the question of who we are while not opening up my response to the 
Other with a sovereign I or We, and instead be listening to what others speak.  The 
point of a new identity politics is to let identity's anomalous body be its strength; that is, 
we should be ready, at any moment, to put our identity into question, and upon critical 
reflection and attending to those who beseech us to be responsible, be ready to see 
how our identity might be complicit in their suffering, and how I might need to 
rearticulate who I am in response.  It is in this willingness to listen to the other, and thus 
change who "I am", that I, in a concretely political sense, respond to the Other.  
Although it might be difficult, we must never let ourselves be certain of who we are, 
because as late-modern identity politics' practice of storytelling shows, being certain of 
who we are and authoring a conclusive story about identity is to write out difference 
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within community.  Our ethical response to the other is not abstract speculation, but an 
orientation of thinking and being in politics.  It is to take a particular stance towards 
identity and its articulation and formation as fundamentally ethical and bound up with my 
relationship to the Other.  The result is the emergence of a real political possibility of not 
always demonizing the other through difference, as Connolly warns against; it is 
achieving what Spivak herself attempts to secure through "suspending oneself into the 
text of the other—for which the first condition and effect is a suspension of the 
conviction that I am necessarily better, I am necessarily indispensable, I am necessarily 
the one to right wrongs, I am necessarily the end product for which history 
happened..."187 
 If this sounds like a variation of a cosmopolitan ethics, that is because such an 
account of a political ethics does share some similarities.  I explicitly share broad 
similarities between my own position and what Appiah has called "rooted 
                                                
187 Spivak 2005, 148; for what it is worth, Spivak herself attempts to secure a culture of responsibility 
through her own literary Derridean deconstruction methodology.  She explicitly suggests that a Levinasian 
approach relies too heavily on a messianism that Derrida himself could not fully rupture (p. 153-154).  
However, I think it ironic that she wishes to refute the Levinasian approach to responsibility while she 
herself blames poor "American-style" education for "[building] on the loss of the cultural habit of assuming 
the agency of responsibility in radical alterity," which makes creating "the responsibility-based subaltern 
layer by the ethics of class-culture difference altogether impossible, consolidating class apartheid (p. 
160)."  For someone who argues that "Our greatest problem was negotiating the difference between 
ethics as imagined from within the self-driven political calculus as 'doing the right thing' and ethics as 
openness towards the imagined agency of the other, responsibility for and to [the other]," I question 
whether Spivak is herself not heavily relying on Levinas to give an account of a culture of responsibility (p. 
161).  Indeed, her characterization of the openness of ethics and the suspension of oneself before 
reading the Other is practically an identical homologue of the eschatology of alterity that I have used in my 
own argument.  I speculate that Spivak's unappreciative reading of Levinas is largely motivated by her 
unwillingness to read Levinas secularly, as I have attempted to do so.  Along with Nedelsky and Spivak, 
however, it should be clear that no one is seriously attempting to transmogrify an essentially ethical 
argument into full normativity by any way except a politics of rights/responsibility.  In addition, I agree with 
Spivak that in this over-rehearsed debate that reason's role in ethics is an honorable and instrumental 
role, but by no means a privileged role of rationalizing ethics fully.  An attempt to rationalize ethics fully is 
to miss entirely the point of infinite ethical inquiry and its necessarily and persistently incomplete status.   
A Politics of Singularity 
 
130 
cosmopolitanism."188  I share the general cosmopolitan commitment to difference within 
community, to formulating this community as global, instead of being constituted along 
national, economic, or anthropological vectors.  Ethical responsibility does not predicate 
itself upon arbitrary differences (indeed, in my own position, all differences are ethically 
arbitrary), but persists and renews itself through and upon such difference.  Put this 
way, I have no qualms with drawing constructive similarities between an ethical identity 
politics to a cosmopolitan political philosophy.  What differentiates my own account from 
cosmopolitanism, crudely delineated, is that the emphasis is not only on cultural 
differences and community diversity.  Rather, having my own identity be put into 
question, to be responsive to the demands of others, and thus to allow difference to 
score through the community and myself, is something cosmopolitanism sometimes 
forgets is necessary to eschew late-modern identity politics.  Levinas would have us 
always open the door of our dwelling and to let our identity be sensitive to all voices, 
and such an imperative lets both identity and community be dynamic and contestable. 
A new identity politics with a new politics ethics might give entirely new meaning 
to the gesture "I love you," so that its meaning is less a claim than a reprise and twist on 
Paul Célan's verse: I am (for) you, if I am. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
188 Appiah 2007, 213-272 
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